Monetizing Tribal and State Sovereign Immunity in Patent Law: An Attempt to Neutralize the Patent Death Squad by Belding, Sean P.
Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 26 | Issue 1 Article 2
Monetizing Tribal and State Sovereign Immunity in
Patent Law: An Attempt to Neutralize the Patent
Death Squad
Sean P. Belding
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual
Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sean P. Belding, Monetizing Tribal and State Sovereign Immunity in Patent Law: An Attempt to Neutralize the Patent Death Squad, 26 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 1 ().
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol26/iss1/2
MONETIZING TRIBAL AND STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN PATENT LAW: AN ATTEMPT TO
NEUTRALIZE THE PATENT DEATH SQUAD
Sean P. Be/ding
On September 8, 2017, Allergan announced the assignment of six of itspatents to the St.
Regis Mohawk Tribe. These six patents protected Allergan 's exclusivity over the blockbuster
drug RESTASIS and were at risk of invalidiy due to an interpartes review proceeding. In
return for substantial monetary consideration, the Mohawk Tribe granted Allergan an
exclusive license back and agreed to invoke its tribal sovereign immunity in an attempt o obtain
a dismissal of the interpartes review proceedings against he RESTASIS patents. Allergan's
strategy is an attempt to monetize sovereign immunity that raises significant concerns in patent
law and reveals an institutional issue stemming from the Supreme Court's state sovereign
immuniy doctrine.
This article tracks and anayzes the rise of state sovereign immunity, its eventual dominance
overpatent law, and its inevitable undermining of interpartes review proceedings. Leveraging
these state sovereign immunity prindples in an attempt to avoid interpartes review proceedings,
Allergan's strategy has revealed an institutional issue that has plagued the passage and
development offlexible patent laws necessay to address an increasingly complex world. This
article argues that Allergan 's attempt to monetize sovereign immunity is a direct result of the
Supreme Court's doctrinal misstep in Seminole Tribe v. Florida. Taken to its extreme, it
appears tates have reached a level of C7zarism that transcends Congress' hope ofpassing and
implementing uniform, fair, and flexible patent legislation to promote and foster innovation,
private rights, and liberty. The article concludes that without substantial alteration in the
Supreme Court's state sovereign immunity doctrine, entities like Allergan will continue using
the doctrine as a weapon in an attempt o circumventpatent law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1990 to 2011, rapid growth.in patent litigation resulted in "burdensome
litigation and uncertainty costs, patent portfolio arms races among large
technology companies, and the opportunistic enforcement of patent rights
.... Il Recognizing these concerns, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act ("AIA") and created interpartes review ("IPR").2 IPR proceedings
allow third parties to challenge the validity of a patent.3 The Patent Trial and
Appeals Board ("PTAB"), an entity established under the AIA, administers IPR
proceedings.4 If the PTAB invalidates portions or all of the patent, the patent's
commercially meaningful parts could be rendered dead and unenforceable
against a patent infringer.5 Congress expected TPR proceedings to "establish a
more efficient and streamlined patent system that [would] improve patent quality
and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs."
' 6
However, some scholars believe IPRs have "destabilized the U.S. patent
system" and that the "PTAB is blatantly unfair to patent holders without the due
Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALiv L.J. 848, 851
(2016); id. at 850 (noting that the number of patent litigation cases doubled in the 1990's and
increased from 2,500 in 2000 to 3,500 in 2011). A patent grants an inventor, or his assignee,
"the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling, [an] invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States .. ." 35 U.S.C.
154(a)(1) (2012).
2 See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPRs 2016-1274,2016-01275,
& 2016-01276 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (Paper 19 at 20) (quoting H.R. RPI-P. No. 112-98, pt. 1,
at 40 (2011) ("Congress created inter partes review to ... improve patent quality and limit
unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.") (internal quotations omitted)).
3 35 U.S.C. 5 311 (a) (2013) ("[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the
Office a petition to institute an interpartes review of the patent."). An IPR is a "trial proceeding
conducted at the Board to review the patentability of one or more claims in a patent" based
solely "under §§ 102 or 103, and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications." Inter Partes Review, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
("USPTO") (Jul. 17, 2014, 6:57 PM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/
appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes- review. Invalidity challenges and a quick
description of the process of filing and instituting an IPR will be discussed in Part III, infra.
4 35 U.S.C. § 6 (b)(1) (2012) ("The Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall--conduct inter
partes reviews and post-grant reviews pursuant to chapters 31 and 32."); Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284,313 (2011) ("There shall be in the [USPTO]
a Patent Trial and Appeal Board.").
5 See 35 U.S.C. 5 282 (b)(1)-(2) (2012) (establishing that invalid patents are unenforceable
against patent infringers); 35 U.S.C. 5 318(b) ("If the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issues a
final written decision ... the Director shall issue and publish a certificate canceling any claim
of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable . .
6 Covidien, (Paper 19 at 20).
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process protections of the district courts."' 7 Specifically, brand name
pharmaceutical companies believe IPR proceedings subject pharmaceutical
patents to double jeopardy because they "already have to face a Congressionally-
mandated validity review process...."8 Recognizing these criticisms and fearing
the invalidation of its patents, Allergan, Inc. ("Allergan"), a multi-billion dollar
pharmaceutical company, created a plan to avoid IPR proceedings.9
On September 8, 2017, Allergan announced the assignment of six of its
patents to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("Mohawk Tribe").10 These six patents
protected Allergan's exclusivity over the blockbuster drug RESTASIS and were
the subject of an ongoing IPR proceeding." In return for substantial monetary
consideration, the Mohawk Tribe "granted back to Allergan 'an irrevocable,
7 Neal Solomon, The Problem of Inter-Partes Review ([PR), IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 8, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/08/problem-inter-partes-review-ipr/id=86287/.
8 Steve Brachmann, Double Jeopardy at the PTAB Forces Allergan and Others to Seek Sovereign
Immunity Defenses, IPWVATCHDOG (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/
02/double-jeopardy-ptab-forces-allergan-seek-sovereign-immunity-defenses/id= 89847/
(citing Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The Conflit Between Hatch-Waxman and Inter Partes
Review, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L PROP. & ENT. L. 14, 22 (2016) (noting that pharmaceutical patents
face invalidity challenges in IPR proceedings and Hatch-Waxman litigation). The second form
of legislation that subjects pharmaceutical patents to invalidity challenges falls under the
Hatch-Waxman Act and will be explained in Part III, infra.
9 Allergan, Forbes (June 6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/companies/allergan/ (noting
Allergan's market cap is at $52.1 billion).
10 See Press Release, Allergan, The Tribe Is Filing Motion to Dismiss Inter Partes Review
of RESTASIS Patents Based On Its Sovereign Immunity (Sept. 8, 2017),
https:/ /www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/alaergan-and-saint-regis-mohawk-
tribe-announce-agr (announcing the assignment of RESTASIS Patents to the Mohawk Tribe
and the motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity) [hereinafter Allergan Press Release].
The Mohawk Tribe, located in Akwesasne, New York, accepted the agreement to pay for
medical costs caused by pollution and to create a new revenue stream for the community.
Letter from Eric Thompson et al., Chief, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, to Sen. Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., & Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Judiciary
Comm. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/site-files/2017-SRMT-Ltr-to-
Gras sley-Feinstein-Judiciary.pdf.
11 See Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., Case 1PR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2016)
(Paper 8) (identifying the RESTASIS patents in ongoing JPR proceedings); Deena Beasley,
Allergan Pays Mohawk Tribe to Protect Patents from Challenges, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2017, 2:50 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents-mohawk/allergan-pays-mohawk-tribe-
to-protect-patents-from-challenges-idUSKCNIBJ2DK ("Sales of Restasis, which totaled over
$1.5 billion last year, account for about 15 percent of Allergan's profits.. ."); U.S. FOOD &
DRUG, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODucTs WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS - PATENT AND EXCLUSIVITY FOR: N050790, https:// www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/cder/ob/patentinfo.cfm?Product_No =001&ApplNo=050790&Appltype=N
(listing the patents protecting the RESTASIS drug).
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perpetual, transferable and exclusive license' 12 and agreed to invoke its tribal
sovereign immunity in an attempt to obtain a dismissal of the IPR proceedings
against the RESTASIS patents.
1 3
Allergan's strategy was motivated by recent PTAB decisions dismissing IPR
proceedings against state entities based on the state sovereign immunity
doctrine.1 4 Allergan and the Mohawk Tribe argue that, similar to state entities,
the Mohawk Tribe is immune from IPR proceedings based on tribal sovereign
immunity.15 Thus, they argue that the RESTASIS patents are immune from IPR
proceedings because the Mohawk Tribe owns the RESTASIS patents.
16 If
Allergan's attempt to monetize tribal sovereign immunity fails, it may turn to
state sovereign immunity to protect its RESTASIS patents.
Although a unique, thought-provoking, and potentially viable strategy,
Allergan is inviting the monetization of sovereign immunity at the cost of
undermining and circumventing patent law. 17 This strategy has significant
implications for the IPR system and the general public. Without a concerted
effort to regulate the states' and tribes' participation in the patent system,
sovereign immunity will likely undermine IPRs.
This article documents the Supreme Court's state sovereign immunity
precedent that led to Allergan's strategy and raises concerns about the
12 Mylan Pharm. Inc., v. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (Paper
130 at 6). In exchange for granting Allergan an exclusive license, the Mohawk Tribe "will
receive $13.75 upon execution of the agreement" and is "eligible to receive $15 million in
annual royalties." See Allergan Press Release, supra note 10.
13 After accepting the agreement with Allergan, the Mohawk Tribe moved to dismiss the
IPR based on its tribal sovereign immunity defense. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc.,
No. IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2017) (Paper 63 at 1). A discussion regarding the
differences between tribal and state sovereign immunity appears in Part III, infra.
14 See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-1274 (P.T.A.B. Jan.
25, 2017) (Paper 19 at 39) (holding that a Florida entity was "entitled to assert its sovereign
immunity as a defense to the institution of an interpartes review."); Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of
Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-208 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017) (Paper 28 at 20) (granting
University of Maryland's motion to dismiss because it was a necessary party to the IPR and
was entitled to a sovereign immunity defense). A discussion of these cases appears in Part 1,
infra. But see, Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-1914 (P.T.A.B. July
13, 2017) (Paper 36 at 15-18) (refusing dismissal of an 1PR based on state sovereign immunity
because the licensee adequately represented the state's interests in the patent and the state was
an unnecessary party) (internal quotations omitted).
15 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23,2018) (Paper
130 at 2) (noting that the Mohawk Tribe is claiming tribal sovereign immunity from IPR
proceedings).
16 Id.
17 See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. , No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL
4619790, slip op. at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) ("[I]n reality [Allergan] has paid the Tribe
to allow Allergan to purchase-or perhaps more precisely, to rent-the Tribe's sovereign
immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the PTO.").
5
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monetization of tribal and state sovereign immunity in patent law. Part I details
the historical development of state sovereign immunity and the Supreme Court's
ever-expanding application of the doctrine. Part II showcases state sovereign
immunity's progressive encroachment on patent law from the 1990's to the
present. Part III discusses Allergan's monetization of tribal sovereign immunity,
the PTAB's and Congress' reaction to Allergan's strategy, and the potential
implications should the strategy prove successful. Part III ends by raising
concerns over the potential monetization of state sovereign immunity if
Allergan's partnership with the Mohawk Tribe fails. Part IV argues that
Allergan's strategy is an unwanted byproduct of the Supreme Court's decision in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida.18
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: "THE [STATE] CAN
Do No WRONG" BUT EVERYONE ELSE CAN
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury .... Where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded. 19
Since Chief Justice Marshall's famous proclamation in Marbuy v. Madison,
private rights have been locked in a heated and losing battle with the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity.20 At the forefront are concerns of federalism, yet the
extension of state sovereign immunity beyond its constitutional bounds
threatens the protection and administration of private federal rights.21 The brief
18 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
20 See Note, Reconciling State Sovereign Immunity with the Fourteenth Amendment, 129 HARv. L.
REV. 1069 (2016) [hereinafter Recond'ng State Sovereign Immunioy] ("Over the last two hundred
years, the seemingly unattainable balance between these federal and state interests has played
out..." in federal court). It is important to note that this type of federalism is different than
the federalism discussed in Part IV, inJfa.
21 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the substantial
encroachment of state sovereign immunity on patent, copyright, trademark, environmental,
and other federal laws); see also, infra note 60; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignoy and Federalsm, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987) ("A state government that orders or allows its officials to violate
citizens' federal constitutional rights can invoke 'sovereign' immunity from all liability ... ");
Recondling State Sovereign Immuniy, supra note 20, at 1068 ("[m1he balance between state
autonomy and federal rights turns in large part on a concept not designed with dual federalism
in mind: state sovereign immunity."); id at 1073 ("Mhe ] Court was caught in the throes of
a federalism revolution that emphasized the rights of states against the federal government
. "...). Federalism is defined as "The legal relationship and distribution of power... between
[Vol. 26:1
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history of state sovereign immunity exemplifies the Supreme Court's gradual
retreat from protecting and emphasizing private rights and showcases an ever
expanding doctrine better defined as "the [state] can do no wrong," but everyone
else can.22 The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the doctrine is ultimately
what allowed the doctrine to invade, subordinate, and undermine patent law.
23
Thus, an overview of the doctrine's origins is necessary to comprehend how the
two areas of law eventually clashed.
24
federal government and the state governments." Federaksm, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 729
(10th ed. 2014).
22 See Reconciling State Sovereign Immuniy, supra note 20, at 1069 (noting the states' use of
sovereign immunity as a defense and its "profound impact on the enforcement of federal
rights.").
23 See Matthew Paik, Sovereign Immunio and Patent Infringement, Ten Years After Florida Prepaid:
The State of the Law and how it Can Be Fixed, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 901 (2009). Matthew Paik details
the unabated expansion of state sovereign immunity over the past twenty years and highlights
the states' ever-increasing use of the broad doctrine to avoid patent infringement, yet enforce
their own patent rights. Id. at 913-14. See also Scott D. Nelson, Big Brother Stole My Patent: The
Expansion of the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immuniy and the Dramatic Weakening of Federal Patent Law,
34 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 271, 273 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court's recent decisions
invite states to exploit copyrights and patents by using sovereign immunity as a shield); Tejas
N. Narechania, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of the "Sword" of State Sovereign
Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1574 (2010) (citing Intellectual Propery
Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciay, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Rep. Howard L.
Berman, Ranking Member, H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop.))
("[S]tating practical effect of these decisions is to allow states to have their cake and eat it too")
(internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No.
IPR2016-1274 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (Paper 19 at 39) (holding that the Florida entity was
immune from an IPR because the "Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to inter partes
review'); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank (Florida Prepaia),
527 U.S. 627, 656-57 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying a pattern of states infringing
patents).
24 The United States government has the right to use and manufacture inventions covered
by United States patents without the owner's permission. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (a) (2012).
However, the United States government also provides patent owners the right to sue the
United States government in the United States Court of Federal Claims to recover "his
reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture." Id. Unlike the United
States government, state governments have rarely, if ever, provided patent owners remedies
for the states' infringement of patents. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 655 (noting that patent
remedies are insufficient, and likely non-existent).
7
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A. THE BIRTH AND EXPANSION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMvlUNITY
1. Chisholm v. Georgia and the Eleventh Amendment: The Birth of State
Sovereign Immunity25
A common misunderstanding is that state sovereign immunity stems directly
and solely from the Eleventh Amendment.26 In actuality, that Amendment
merely confirmed the continued viability of the immunity. The Supreme Court
crafted and extrapolated the majority of the doctrine from English common law
and the intent of the Framers of the Constitution.27 During the Constitutional
Convention and ratification of the Constitution, several Framers assumed that
absent a state's consent, states were immune from private suits brought against
them in federal court.28 Article III drastically changed the conversation. Article
HI states, "In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction.'2 9 The plain meaning of Article III appeared to
eliminate state sovereign immunity in suits brought by private citizens in federal
court.30 Adopting this plain meaning in Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
invoked federal jurisdiction over a breach of contract action brought by a South
Carolina citizen against the State of Georgia.
31
25 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
26 See Paik, supra note 23, at 903 ("[S] overeign immunity is commonly believed to be granted
by the Eleventh Amendment... the reality is that the Supreme Court has crafted this doctrine
over the last two hundred years.").
27 Alexander Hamilton aptly articulated the origins of state sovereign immunity when he
stated: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is... the general practice of mankind; and the exemption,
as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State .... "
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). See also, Paik,
supra note 23, at 904 ("Citing history and its understanding of the Framers' intent ... the
Eleventh Amendment was spurred by an interest in the principle of sovereign immunity .... );
Narechania, supra 23, at 1577 ("State sovereign immunity finds its roots in the preconstitutional
era."); see, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1890) (establishing state sovereign
immunity based on the Framers' intent); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996)
(citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) ("[lIt... serves
to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties.. .'')
28 See Narechania, supra note 23, at 1577 n. 14 (noting that the "Founding contemporaries
... believed that the Constitution did not create a federal judiciary capable of adjudicating
cases involving states.").
29 U.S. const. art. III. § 2.
30 See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunily: State Waivers, Private
Contracts, And Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 279 ("During the debates over
ratification... Article III seemed to divest states of that immunity in federal courts ... ".
31 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 452 (1793), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. const. amend. X1. In Chisholm, the Supreme Court stated "when a State, by
[Vol. 26:1
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In direct response to Chisholm and fearing the impact of revolutionary debts
on state treasuries, Congress unanimously passed the Eleventh Amendment.
32
The Eleventh Amendment states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State . . .,33
The Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibited an out-of-state citizen from
bringing an action against a state.34 However, the Eleventh Amendment
remained conspicuously silent regarding actions brought by in-state citizens
against their own state.35 The Supreme Court addressed this discrepancy in Hans
v. Louisiana.
36
2. Hans v. Louisiana: Expanding State Sovereign Immunio Based on the
Framers' Intent
37
In Hans v. Louisiana, a Louisiana citizen brought an action against Louisiana
in federal court challenging amendments to the state constitution.38 Relying
heavily on the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court stated, "Any such power as
that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals against
the States, had been expressly disclaimed, and even resented, by the great
defenders of the Constitution whilst it was on its trial before the American
people. ' 39 The Supreme Court dismissed the Louisiana citizen's action against
adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United
States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty." Id.
32 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment was
"unanimously proposed, and ... adopted ... " by the third Congress (1794) in response to
Chisholm); see also, Bohannan, supra note 30, at 279 ("Because states were concerned with
protecting their treasuries from suits brought against them for the collection of Revolutionary
War debts, Congress reacted swiftly to the Court's decision in Chisholm by adopting the
Eleventh Amendment.'). But see, Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immuniy,
29 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 721, 731 (2002) ("For Iredell, state sovereign immunity was alive
and incorporated (or, at least, left unabridged) by the Judiciary Act, and therefore Georgia was
not amenable to suit.").
33 U.S. const. amend. XI.
34 Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
35 See id. at 10. In Hans, the Supreme Court noted that "the plaintiff in error contends that
... the Eleventh Amendment... only prohibits suits against a State which are brought by the
citizens of another State .... It is true, the amendment does so read .... " Id. See also, Paik,
supra note 23, at 903 ("The text does not say ... that the Amendment bars the federal
government from hearing cases between a citizen of a state against his own state.").
36 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 9 ("The question is presented, whether a State can be sued in a
Circuit Court of the United States by one of its own citizens ..
37 Hans, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
38 Id. at 9.
39 Id. at 12.
9
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Louisiana and held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over suits brought by
citizens against their own states.4° Thus, the Supreme Court bound state
sovereign immunity to the Framers' intent and stretched it beyond the Eleventh
Amendment. Absent a state's waiver or congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity, Hans substantially limited private party suits against states
in federal courts.
41
B. WAIVER OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
States can waive sovereign immunity by agreeing to specific statutes or by
their conduct during litigation.42 However, the Supreme Court has narrowly
tailored these two types of waiver. In Edelman v. Jordan, the Supreme Court held
that statutory waiver exists "only where stated by the most express language or
by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.'43 Furthermore, a state's participation in
interstate commerce does not constitute voluntary waiver.44 Thus, states must
expressly waive their right to sovereign immunity and do not impliedly or
constructively waive it by simply participating in congressional programs or
interstate commerce.
45
40 Id. at 17 ("[N]either a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court
in this country without their consent... ").
41 In ExParte Young the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can seek prospective, injunctive
relief against a state official. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908). However, as Michael
Landau states, "such a remedy falls far short of making the intellectual property owner whole.
Injunctions are prospective relief and can guard only against future infringements, thus they
do nothing to remedy the past injury that initially justified the injunction." Michael Landau,
State Sovereign Immuni y and Intellectual Properly Revisited, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 513, 543 (2012). Furthermore, the Ex Parte Young doctrine is ineffective in IPR
proceedings because the petitioner is not seeking prospective, injunctive relief. Therefore, this
article refrains from addressing the Ex Parte Young doctrine in substantial detail.
42 See Narechania, supra note 23, at 1580 ("The Court has recognized two forms of waiver:
an explicit statutory waiver and waiver by litigation conduct."). Other forms of waiver exist,
but for the purposes of this article these are the two most pertain types of waiver. See
Bohannan, supra note 30 (detailing the implications of state waiver in patent law).
43 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (citing Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213
U.S. 151,171 (1909)) (internal quotations omitted).
44 See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings), 527
U.S. 666, 691 (1999) ("[T]he sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was ... [not]
voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce."). College Savings v. Florida
Prepaid is discussed in greater detail in Part II.C, infra.
45 See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 678-82 (holding that a state's participation in interstate
commerce does not constructively waive sovereign immunity). In Edelman v. Jordan, the
Supreme Court stated, "The mere fact that a State participates in a program through which
the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of
[Vol. 26:1
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In Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, the Supreme Court held that
a state waives its sovereign immunity in federal court when it "voluntarily
becomes a party to a cause."46 However, the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have narrowly interpreted what constitutes voluntary waiver, as will be
discussed in multiple cases in Part 1I, infra. State waiver exists, but states rarely,
if ever, surrender sovereign immunity unless they are apt to gain from the
litigation.47 Congressional abrogation is the remaining mechanism used to quell
state sovereign immunity.
C. DIGNIFYING STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AT THE EXPENSE OF
CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION
Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity provides, in certain
circumstances, a private right of action for private damage suits against states
that violate federal law.48 To abrogate state sovereign immunity, Congress must:
(1) "unequivocally expressH its intent to abrogate the immunity;" and (2) "actH
pursuant to a valid exercise of power," typically under the Fourteenth
Amendment.49 Initially, the Supreme Court held that Congress could abrogate
state sovereign immunity under Article I of the Constitution or Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 0 Article I grants Congress the power to regulate
public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal
courts." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673.
46 Gunter v. Ad. Coast line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906).
47 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 658-
59, (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[it is well known that not all States have waived their
sovereign immunity from suit, and among those States that have, the contours of this waiver
vary widely."). In Florida Prepaid v. College Savings, Stevens disputed whether adequate remedies
existed in state courts when states infringed a patent or whether states were even willing to
waive their sovereign immunity defense in state or federal court. See id. at 657-60.
48 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immuni And the Ideology of the Eleventh
Amendment, 52 DuKE L.J. 1167, 1182 (2003) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976)) ("Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity by passing a statute that expressly
provides for private damage suits against states.").
49 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,
68 (1985)). "Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious from
'a clear legislative statement."' Id. at 55. "A general authorization for suit in federal court is not
the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985). For example, in Florida Prepaid
v. College Savings, the Supreme Court agreed that the Patent Remedy Act unequivocally
expressed Congress' intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity because it stated "Any State
... shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the constitution of the United
States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in federal court ... for
infringement of a patent." Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632.
50 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) ("[T[he power to regulate
commerce includes the power to override States' immunity from suit. . .'); id. at 7 ("Congress
11
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interstate commerce.51 Congress presumed that Article I granted it the power to
"override States' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce
Clause."
5 2
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the
states.5 3 The Due Process Clause prevents the states from "depriv[ing] a person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'5 4 Congress presumed
that its power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was relatively expansive.55 However, in two cases
during the 1990's, the Supreme Court expanded state sovereign immunity at the
expense of minimizing and complicating Congressional abrogation power.
1. Seminole Tribe v. Florida: Abolilion ofArticle I CongressionalAbrogation56
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court eliminated Congress' power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under Article I because the "Eleventh Amendment
restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. 57 The
Court reasoned that the doctrine was designed "to avoid the indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of
private parties.' '5 8 Thus, the Court expanded state sovereign immunity far
beyond the protection of a state's treasury; the doctrine was now
may override [sovereign] immunity when it acts pursuant to the power granted it under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment...").
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the power ... To regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes").
52 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19.
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XJV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.'); see also Due Process, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) ("The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for
the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair
hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.').
54 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.').
55 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.'); Florida Preaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (requiring a pattern of states violating constitutional
rights to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
56 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
57 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
58 Id. at 58 (punctuation omitted).
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indistinguishable from a state's dignity and deeply rooted in common law.59 The
elimination of Congress' power to abrogate under Article I drastically diminished
federal protections for private citizens seeking damages against states violating
their federal rights.60 Realizing the far reaching implications of the Supreme
Court's vast expansion and strengthening of the doctrine, states began raising
their sovereign rights to evade federal laws, including patent laws.
61
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's elimination of Article I abrogation severally
restricted Congress' ability to pass progressive and flexible legislation needed to
regulate an increasingly "interrelated and complex" national market.62 Congress'
remaining option to abrogate state sovereign immunity resides under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
63
59 Justice Stevens' dissent in Seminole Tribe v. Florida Prepaid questioned the majority's
unfettered submission to state sovereign immunity and questioned the common law
justification of the doctrine. Id. Rebutting the majority's basis for state sovereign immunity,
Stevens wrote:
In sum, as far as its common-law ancestry is concerned, there is no better reason for the rule
of sovereign immunity 'than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.' Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). That 'reason' for the perpetuation of this
ancient doctrine certainly cannot justify the majority's expansion of it. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S..
at 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens believed that "the sovereignty of the individual States
[was] subordinate both to the citizenry of each State and to the supreme law of the federal
sovereign." Id.
60 In his dissent, Justice Stevens articulated the impact of eliminating Congress' power to
abrogate under Article I when he stated, "it prevents Congress from providing a federal forum
for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law,
to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental l w, and the regulation of our vast national
economy." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.. at 77.
61 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 656 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting several cases where states infringed patents and highlighting Congress'
finding that "state infringement of patents was likely to increase."); Xechem Int'l., Inc. v. Univ.
of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J.,
concurring) ("IThere is an increasing urgency, as the states enter the private competitive arena
governed by the laws of intellectual property, to establish fair relationships and just recourse.');
see also, Pak, supra note 23, at 913 (noting the increase in frequency of state patent infringement
following Florida Prepaid v. College Savings); Landau, supra 41, at 552-553 ("There might not have
been a pattern found at the time ... but there most certainly is a pattern of abuse now. The
actual number of controversies is far larger; most violations do not go to trial, they settle.").
62 Col. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Modern commerce and the technology upon which it rests
need large markets and seek government large enough to secure trading rules that permit
industry to compete in the global marketplace ...').
63 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637 ("Congress retains the authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.').
13
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2. Ci y of Boerne v. Flores: Complicating Seclion 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendmen64
Just over a year after Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court severely limited
Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.65 In Ci ofBoerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") was an invalid
application of Congress' enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.66 The Court stated that any abrogation under Section 5 required
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end."' 67 RFRA was not a remedial or preventive
law; instead, it sought to "interpret and elaborate on the meaning" of the Free
Exercise Clause, creating substantive law in the process.68 Thus, to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under Section 5, Congress must show an egregious pattern
of states violating federal law, prove that the injured party lacks any remedies in
federal court, state court, or agency proceedings, and fashion a law explicitly and
narrowly that addresses the injury without impeding on the Supreme Court's
power to interpret the constitution.69 The Supreme Court's overwhelmingly strict
64 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
65 See Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies for Pubic Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1351 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court established a stringent test in Ci of Boerne
to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5); Evan H. Caminker, 'Appropriate"
Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) ("MIn Ci of Boerne v.
F/ores and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has tightened the doctrinal test for
prophylactic legislation based on Section Five.").
6 Ci ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
67 Id. at 520.
8 Id. at 524; see Paik, supra 23, at 911 ("[Ihe Supreme Court held that RFRA granted far
more rights than what the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment required the
government to provide.').
69 When Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity under Section 5, it is enforcing its
powers under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, 5 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 5 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). The deprivation of a private party's
interest by the state is a violation of Section 5 and empowers Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity to provide a congruent and proportional remedy. See FArida Prepaid, 527
U.S. at 642-43 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)) ("In procedural due
process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest ... is not
in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without
due process of law.') (emphasis deleted) (internal quotation, deleted). However, Congress'
enforcement must remain remedial and cannot "decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States." Ci of Boerne 521 U.S. at 519.
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and complex standard has drastically minimized Congress' power to subject
states to federal law.
70
D. THE SUPREME COURT'S SUBMISSION TO STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
A LOOPHOLE RIPE FOR ABUSE
The Supreme Court's complete submission to state sovereign immunity,
ignorance of implied and constructive waiver, and subordination of
Congressional abrogation raises the question whether "the [states] can do no
harm," but everyone else can. Equipped with the power to enforce federal rights
and shielded from non-consensual federal jurisdiction, the states have
advantageously decided to circumvent and undermine patent law. Any
Congressional attempt "to place States on the same footing as private parties"
will likely be futile in the future.71 Overall, the Supreme Court's broad state
sovereign immunity doctrine professed in Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne created
a loophole ripe for abuse in patent law.72 The next section explores this loophole,
which has caused the progressive invasion and undermining of patent law.
III. EXTENDING STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO PATENT LAW: BUILDING
A LEGAL FOUNDATION THAT ENCOURAGES THE MONETIZATION
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
From 1990 to 2018, Congress and the courts have jostled over the supremacy
between state sovereign immunity and patent law. While Congress attempted to
protect patent rights and promote the "Progress of... useful Arts," the Supreme
Court, the Federal Circuit, and the PTAB constantly upheld state sovereign
immunity over patent law. 3 Each case and administrative decision represents a
70 See supra note 60. The Supreme Court itself attested to the stringent and complex standard
in Ciy of Boerne when it stated, "While the line between measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is
not easy to discern... the distinction exists and must be observed." City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at
519-20. The Supreme Court's inconsistent application and deeply divided opinions evidence
the complexity and strictness of the congruence and proportionality test. Compare Nev. Dep't
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (upholding Congress' Section 5 abrogation
in the family-care provision of The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993), with Coleman v. Court
of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 37-38 (2012) (ruling Congress' Section 5 abrogation in the self-care
provision of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 violated the Ciy of Boerne Test). The
Supreme Court used the congruence and proportionality test to evaluate abrogation under two
provisions of the same act and came out with different results. Id. The two cases exemplify
the complexity and the randomness of the Supreme Court's Ciy of Boerne test.
71 Florida Prepaid , 527 U.S. at 647.
72 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Ciy of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
73 Under the Intellectual Property Clause (the "IP Clause") of the U.S. Constitution,
Congress has the power "[To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
15
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different right in patent law granted to the states through state sovereign
immunity. These rights include: (1) the right to infringe another's patent without
repercussions;74 (2) the right to reap the benefits of the patent system and enforce
the state's patents without constructively waiving state sovereign immunity;75 (3)
the state's right to protect its patent licensee from declaratory judgments;
76 (4)
the right to immunity from IPR proceedings;77 and (5) the state's right to protect
its patent licensee from TPR proceedings.78 Collectively, these cases make up the
bundle of state sovereign immunity rights in patent law that Allergan used as its
foundation in its attempt to manipulate and circumvent patent law.79 Part II
establishes the terminology necessary to understand the inner workings of
Allergan's strategy, discusses the decisions that led to each state sovereign
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. During this time, Congress was also attempting
to conform the U.S. patent laws to international standards and handle the vast influx of patent
filings and infringement suits. See Introduction, supra (noting the passage of the AIA). The
biggest change in the U.S. patent system was the change from a first-to-invent system to a
first-to-file system. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 26 (Racehl E. Barkow et al.
eds., 4,h ed. 2017) ("[T]he [AIA] is the most significant legislative reform since 1952 ... the
most noteworthy is the shift from the first-to-invent system of priority to a first-inventor-to-
file system"). This goes beyond the scope of this article, but is important for context. The
Federal Circuit is called the "United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit" and has
"exclusive jurisdiction .... of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States... in any civil action arising under.., any Act of Congress relating to patents .... 28
U.S.C. 5 1295(a)(1) (2012).
74 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627 (granting states the right to infringe a patent without
repercussion). This right specifically refers to monetary damages. See Landau, supra note 41, at
543 (discussing the importance of making the patent holder whole for past infringement).
75 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635 (citing Coloege Savings, 527 U.S. at. 680 ) (holding that
a state's participation in the patent system does not constructively waive its right to sovereign
immunity).
76 See A123 Sys. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (dismissing a dedaratory
judgment action because the state was a necessary and indispensable party that could not be
joined with the state's licensee due to state sovereign immunity).
77 Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. 1PR2016-1274 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25,
2017) (Paper 19 at 39). (holding that a Florida entity was "entitled to assert its sovereign
immunity as a defense to the institution of an interpartes review.').
78 See Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. EPR2016-208 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017)
(Paper 28 at 20) (granting University of Maryland's motion to dismiss an IPR against it and its
licensee because the University was a necessary party to the IPR and was entitled to sovereign
immunity).
79 Property rights are often described as a bundle of rights. Propery, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining property as "[c]ollectively, the tights in a valued
resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible. It is common to describe property as a 'bundle
of rights."'). This idea of a bundle of rights helps organize the information going forward. It
is best to think of every case and administrative proceeding as a stick. When combined, the
sticks make up a bundle of sticks or a bundle of rights. This bundle of rights acquired by the
states through state sovereign immunity is ultimately what led to Allergan's strategy.
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immunity right in patent law, and briefly recaps the foundation that led to
Allergan's attempt to monetize sovereign immunity.
A. SETTING THE STAGE: DEFINING PATENT LAW TERMS AND THE
"STATE"
1. Defining Patentabilio and Patent Infringement Defenses
Under the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has
the power "[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and the usefulArts by securing
for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."80 Congress used its power to build a quid pro quo patent
system.81 In exchange for disclosing the invention, the inventor is granted a
patent that gives "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, H selling... or importing the invention..." for a limited period of time.
82
To obtain a patent in modern patent law, the inventor must file for a patent with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and meet the five
elements of patentability: (1) patentable subject matter; (2) utility; (3) novelty; (4)
nonobviousness; and (5) specification requirements.83 Once the patent is
80 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). The "useful Arts" and "Discoveries" are
thought to refer to technology, inventions, and patents. See NARD, supra note 73, at 18 (noting
that Congress had the power to "grant[ exclusive rights for limited times to inventors for their
discoveries.") (emphasis omitted).
81 See NARD, supra note 73, at 3 ("[P]atent law can be viewed as an incentive-based system
of laws that offers a potential financial reward as an inducement to invent, to disclose technical
information .. .'); id. ("&QJuid pro quo-the right to exclude is bestowed upon one who
discloses a useful invention to society.. ."); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy
Grp., LLC, 138 S.Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) ("Specifically, patents are 'public franchises' that the
Government grants 'to the inventors of new and useful improvements."').
82 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1) (2012); 5 154(a)(2) ("[Sluch grant shall be for a term beginning on
the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application
for the patent was filed ... "); § 101, 112 (requiring the inventor to disclose sufficient
information to such that a person skilled in the art of the technology could recreate the
invention).
83 See 35 U.S.C. 55 101, 102, 103, 112(a) (2012). Section 101 states "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 requires the invention
to be patentable subject matter or in other words, a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter that is not an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. See
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 5§ 2106.03, 2106.04 (9th ed., rev. 8) (Aug. 2017),
(detailing the examination of an invention under Section 101) [hereinafter MPEP]. Section 101
also requires "the invention as a whole [to] be useful." MPEP § 2103. Section 112(a) requires
the inventor to file an application that "contain[s] a full and clear disclosure of the invention."
MPEP 5 608. Section 102 requires the invention as claimed in the patent application to be
17
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acquired, the inventor ("patentee" or "patent owner'") can enforce her patent in
federal courts against others that infringe the patent by making, using, offering
for sale, selling, or importing the patented invention.84
However, filing a patent infringement suit does not come without peril for
the patentee. A defendant alleged to have infringed a patent can argue, in what
is called an "invalidity defense," that the patent was improperly granted in the
first place and is thus invalid and unenforceable.85 An invalidity defense attacks
the patentability of the invention;86 if a defendant wins, then all or a portion of
the patent is rendered invalid and unenforceable.87 Essentially this could kill the
novel. See MPEP § 2131 ("A claimed invention may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102 when the
invention is anticipated (or is "not novel") over a disclosure that is available as prior art."). An
invention is not novel if a single prior piece of literature disclosed every element of the claimed
invention before the inventor filed for a patent See Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of
California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A claim is anticipated only if each and every
element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single
prior art reference."). Section 103 requires the inventor to disclose and claim an invention that
was not obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The obviousness inquiry is intended to ensure that
inventors are submitting inventions that offer a "leap forward" in technology. NARD, supra
note 73, at 329. The obviousness inquiry is complicated even for patent lawyers. See Gene
Quinn, Understanding Obviousness: John Deere and the Basics, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 10, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/201 0/10/understanding-obviousness-john-deere-and-the-
basics-2/id=62393/ (stating that the obviousness inquiry "is frustrating because the legal
.- determination about whether an invention is obvious seems completely subjective and
sometimes even arbitrary.'); Christopher C. Kennedy, Rethinking Obviousness, 2015 WIs. L. REV.
665, 667 (2015) ("Scholars, commentators, and practitioners alike have also struggled with and
debated the concept of nonobviousness. Every ear, without fail, numerous journal articles
are published in which various elements of the nonobviousness analysis are discussed and
criticized.") (citations omitted). Thus, for purposes of this article one can think of obviousness
as the combination of multiple prior inventions that would lead the inventor to the claimed
invention he or she wishes to patent. See 35 U.S.C. 5103. (stating that an invention is obvious
"if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.").
- 35 U.S.C. 271 (2010) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
85 35 U.S.C. 5 282(b)(2) (2012) ("The following shall be defenses in any action involving
the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: ... Invalidity of the patent or any
claim in suit on any ground specified in part II as a condition for patentability'); 35 U.S.C. 5
282(b)(3) (2012) (stating that a defense can be brought that challenges the validity of a patent
under Sections 112 and 251). This is known as an invalidity defense that relies on 35 U.S.C. 5§
101, 102, 103, and 112 to prove that the patent was improperly granted by the USPTO. This
is a cursory look at these sections, but it will be sufficient for the purposes of this article.
86 Id. § 282(b)(3).
87 See Roger Ford, Patent Invalidi* versus Noninringement, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 71, 109 ("A
successful invalidity defense acts in rem on the patent claims that were found invalid: generally,
18
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patent and destroy the patentee's exclusivity over the invention.88 Therefore, a
defendant could infringe a patent, but not be liable if the patent is found to be
invalid.
Additionally, defendants and other third parties can file IPRs against a patent
to challenge its validity. An "[IPR is a trial proceeding conducted at the [PTAB]
to review the patentability of one or more claims in a patent only on a ground
that could be raised under 5 102 or 103, and only on the basis of prior art
consisting of patents or printed publications."89 Similar to invalidity findings in
federal court, if the PTAB invalidates all or portions of a patent, its commercially
meaningful parts of the patent could be rendered dead and unenforceable against
the defendant. This broad understanding of patentability, patent infringement,
and invalidity challenges is crucial to understanding the subject matter that
follows.
2. Who Is the "State?": Universities, Licensing Arms of Universities, Agencies,
and State Run Organizations
It is important to establish who the "state" actually is in the context of patent
law. The Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity "shieldHStates
from suit in federal court[s] without their consent ...."90 However, the term
"States" also encompasses "state agents and state instrumentalities."'91
Determining whether an instrumentality is an "arm" of the state depends on "the
nature of the entity created by state law."' 92 Federal courts typically rely on certain
factors to determine whether an instrumentality is an arm of the state.
93 It is
those claims are dead and cannot be enforced in any subsequent patent litigation against the
same or different defendants.") (citation omitted).
88 Id.
89 INTER PARTES REVIEW, U.S. PATENT & TRADIMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-
decisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
90 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994).
91 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (citations omitted)
("It has long been settled that the reference to actions against one of the United States
encompasses ... certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.") (internal
quotations omitted).
92 Id. at 429-30 (1997) (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977)) (internal quotations omitted).
93 See, e.g., Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Mhis Court uses four
factors to determine whether an entity is an 'arm of the State'... (1) how state law defines the
entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity
derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.") (citations
omitted); Ristow v. S.C. Ports Auth., 58 F.3d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1995) (using four factors
similar to the ones used by the Eleventh Circuit in Manders v. Lee); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore
19
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unnecessary to conduct a lengthy analysis concerning the status of an
instrumentality for this article; generally, however, courts have found that the
following entities are arms of the state: (1) state universities (such as the
University of Texas); (2) state licensing organizations (such as the University of
Florida Research Foundation); and (3) state run organizations (such as the South
Carolina State Ports Authority).94 This brief understanding of who the "state" is
will help the reader understand what entities are actually immune from suit.
B. THE STATE'S RIGHT TO INFRINGE ANOTHER'S PATENT WITHOUT
FACING REPERCUSSIONS
1. Congressional Acknowledgment of States Abusing Sovereign Immuniy in
Patent Law: Chew v. California95
In Chew v. California, the leading case prompting congressional action, Marian
F. Chew, an Ohio resident, sued the State of California for using her patented
method to test automobile engine exhaust emissions.96 In 1990, The Federal
Circuit in held that California was immune from patent infringement because
Congress had not yet expressly abrogated state sovereign immunity in the patent
statute.97 Recognizing the impact of Chew, Congress passed the Patent and Plant
Nat'l. Lab., 65 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cit. 1995) (using five factors similar to the ones used by the
Eleventh Circuit in Manders v. Lee). These factors are derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Ageny. See Ristow, 58 F.3d at 1052 n.3
("Distilling the Lake Country Estates criteria, this court has stated the formula as a four-part,
non-exclusive inquiry. . .") (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l. Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979)).
94 See, e.g., Xechem Int'l., Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324,
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (identifying a Texas statute that designated the University of Texas as an
arm of the state of Texas); Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, Case No.
1:16CV183--MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3869877, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (determining that
the University of Florida Research Foundation was an arm of the state of Florida); Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 n. 6 (2002) (recognizing the
South Carolina State Ports Authority as an instrumentality of the state of South Carolina);
Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1124 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (holding
that state universities are arms of the state).
95 Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cit. 1990).
96 Id. at 332; see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 655 (1999) (citing H. R. REP. No. 101 -960, pt. 1, at 7, and n. 20 (1990)) ("Chew prompted
Congress to consider the legislation that became the Patent Remedy Act').
97 Chew, 893 F.2d. at 334 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243
(1985)) ("Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in
unmistakable language in the statute itself."). Additionally, the Federal Circuit presumed that
a due process violation was non-existent because the Federal Circuit believed state law
remedies were still available to Chew. Id at 336 n. 5 (noting that its decision only foreclosed
"one avenue of recourse - the specific relief for infringement of patent rights otherwise
[Vol. 26:1
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Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (the "Patent Remedy Act") in
1992.98 The Patent Remedy Act stated:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his
official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh
amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any
person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity,
for infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any other
violation under this title.
99
Congress thought the Patent Remedy Act would overcome the hurdle
encountered in Chew, but the Supreme Court thought otherwise in Florida Prepaid
v. College Savings.10
provided by federal statute). However, the Federal Circuit's presumption was likely farfetched.
For example, during Congress' Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
hearing, a professor noted that manipulating a patent infringement claim to look like a
California tort claim was nearly impossible and presumed these r medies would be available
in every state. Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H. RP 3886 before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Propery, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiday,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 33-34 (1990) (hereinafter House Hearings (statement of Robert Merges).
Furthermore, Nicholas Dernik notes that federal law restricts patent venue and jurisdiction to
the federal courts and thus, federal law generally precludes state courts from hearing patent
claims. Nicholas Denrik, State Sovereign Immuniy: States Use The Federal Patent L.aw System As Both
A ShieldAndA Sword, 8J. MARSHALL Riiv. INTELL. PROP. L. 134, 136 (2008) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338). Justice Stevens addresses this presumption in his Florida Prepaid dissent. See Part
IJ.B.2.b, infra.
98 "[Chew's] invention was primarily used by States and other governmental entities."
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If Chew's invention had little use
outside of state and other governmental agencies, then the right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention that Chew thought she was receiving
for disclosing her invention was essentially meaningless. Without a remedy, Congress passed
the Patent Remedy Act in hopes of expressly abrogating state sovereign immunity for patent
infringement.
- 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1992) (emphasis added). The Patent Remedy Act also amended
Section 271 of Title 35, stating that "the term 'whoever' includes any State, any instrumentality
of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his
official capacity." 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1952).
100 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (holding that the patent remedy act was
unconstitutional because it was not properly abrogated under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
21
Belding: Monetizing Tribal and State Sovereign Immunity in Patent Law: An
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law,
J. IJNTELL PROP. L
2. Abolishing the Patent Remedy Act in Favor of State Sovereign Immunity:
Florida Prepaid v. College Savingsl
The Constitution was intended to limit the powers of the federal government,
but failed to restrict state governments from violating citizens' rights.
10 2
Responding to the states' violations of African American rights in the south after
the Civil War, Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment.10 3 The Fourteenth
Amendment was passed to "limit state power by imposing on state governments
constitutional obligations.., to provide due process .... ,104 Under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of" the Fourteenth Amendment.0 5 Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty, or propery, without due process of law ... "106 Patents are property.
107
Thus, a state deprives a patent owner of his property without due process when
the state infringes a patent and provides no remedy.'08 The Patent Remedy Act
was intended to "prevent States from depriving patent owners of 0 property
without due process."'1 9 However, the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge
Congress' power to pass the Patent Remedy Act in Florida Prepaid v. College Savings.
In Florida Prepaid v. College Savings, College Savings Bank ("College Savings")
alleged that Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expenses Board ("Florida
Prepaid"), a state instrumentality, infringed its patent protecting a financing
methodology when it allegedly used College Savings' financing method to
101 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 627 (1999).
102 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfuflled Promise,
25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1143, 1145 (1992) ("The original Constitution, which served almost
exclusively to create a national government and limit its powers, was expressly changed to
restrict state governments.").
103 See id. ("After the Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
of slavery, African Americans were persecuted and oppressed in the South.').
104 Id.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added).
106 Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
107 35 U.S.C. 5 261 (2012) ("Subject to the provisions of this tide, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property.').
108 Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104
U.S. 356, 358 (1882) ("[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the
patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without
just compensation.")) (internal quotations omitted); see Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 ("a
State's infringement of a patent, though interfering with a patent owner's right to exclude
others, does not by itself violate the Constitution. Instead, only where the State provides no
remedy ... could a deprivation of property without due process result').
109 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633.
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administer its tuition prepayment programn °0 College Savings relied on the
Patent Remedy Act to neutralize Florida Prepaid's state sovereign immunity
defense."' Conversely, Florida Prepaid argued that the Patent Remedy Act was
unconstitutional because it attempted to confer private rights beyond those
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 12 College Savings argued that the
Patent Remedy Act was constitutional because states, like Florida, were
"depriving a patentee of property without due process of law"1 13 "by infringing
the patent and then pleading immunity to an infringement suit.11 4 The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that the Patent Remedy Act was unconstitutional
because it did "not respond to a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation
of constitutional rights' of the sort Congress H faced in enacting proper
prophylactic 5 5 legislation.'1l15
a. Florida Prepaid Majoriy Opinion: Avoiding the Underying Issues of
State Involvement in Patent Law
Although Congress attempted to explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity
in the Patent Remedy Act, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress failed to
demonstrate a perverse pattern of state patent infringement that "transgress[ed]
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions;"116 these are the only
provisions that Congress was empowered to enforce against the states.117 Under
110 Id. at 630-31. The patent protected College Saving's "financing methodology, designed
to guarantee investors sufficient funds to cover the costs of tuition for colleges."
111 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(h)) ("As used in this section, the term 'whoever' includes any
State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality
of a State acting in his official capacity.").
112 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627 (No. 98-531), 1999 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 970 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("While Congress
can enact legislation under § 5 to enforce the Due Process Clause, Congress cannot 'decree
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states' simply by declaring
that patent infringement effects a deprivation of property without due process.").
113 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642.
114 Id. at 641.
115 Id. at 645 (quoting Ciy of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
116 Id. at 635, 639.
17 See ERWIN CHEMFRINSKY & RAYMOND PRYKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCPLES AND
POLICws 231 (Richard A. Epstien et al. eds., 5th ed. 2015) ("The current law is that Congress
may authorize suits against state governments only when it is acting pursuant to §5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
23
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Ciy of Boerne, Congress may only pass remedial legislation, not substantive
legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.118
Adhering to Ciy of Boerne, the Supreme Court first identified the injury as
"state infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent
owners compensation for the invasions of their patent rights."' 19 Next, the Court
asked whether "the Patent Remedy Act ... [was] remedial or preventative
legislation aimed at securing the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for
patent owners." 20  The Court then contrasted Congress' evidence of
"unremedied patent infringement by the States" with evidence of constitutional
violations during the voting rights cases,121 stating, "[u]nlike the undisputed
record of racial discrimination confronting Congress in the voting rights cases
... Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of
the States."'122 Consequently, the Court found that Congress failed to
demonstrate a consistent pattern of state patent infringement or constitutional
violations sufficient to enact the Patent Remedy Act.'23 Additionally, the Court
found that deprivation of property without due process would only arise where
state remedies were inadequate or nonexistent.124 Thus, the Court found that the
Patent Remedy Act was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress' power
118 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) ("The remedial and preventive
nature of Congress' enforcement power, and the limitation inherent in the power, were
confirmed in our earliest cases on the Fourteenth Amendment.").
119 Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
120 Id. at 639.
121 Id. at 640 The voting tights cases addressed the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 and Congress' power to deter and remedy constitutional violations related to voting
rights. See Ciy of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518-19 (discussing the voting rights cases and Congress'
proper exercise of abrogating state sovereign immunity).
122 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525-27
(1997)).
123 Id. at 640, 645-46 ("Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to a
handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the
Constitution.'). The Supreme Court naively noted that "[t]estimony before the House
Subcommittee in favor of the bill acknowledged that 'states are willing and able to respect
patent rights. The fact that there are so few reported cases involving patent infringement
claims against states underlies the point."' Id. at 641 (citing House Hearings, 56) (statement of
William S. Thompson); id. ("States do occasionally find themselves in patent infringement
suits') (citing House Hearings, 32) (statement of Robert Merges). The Supreme Court gravely
missed the mark in this case, over committing to the City of Boerne holding and ignoring the
pending state abuses of patent law that Justice Stevens observed were slowly taking shape. See
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 656-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the influx in states infringing
patents and the rise of state sovereign immunity at the expense of patent law).
124 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S.. at 643 ("[O]nly where the State provides no remedy, or only
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a
deprivation of property without due process result.") (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
539-41 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984)).
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to remedy and prevent constitutional violations under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 25 Simply put, the majority thought the harm identified
by Congress was too "speculative" to fit under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 26
b. Stevens' Florida Prepaid Dissent. Foreshadowing the States' Abuse of
Patent Law
"Consistency, uniformity, and familiarity with the extensive and relevant
body of patent jurisprudence are matters of overriding significance in this area
of the law ... which, if undermined, would necessarily decrease the efficacy of
the process afforded to patent holders.1 27 Justice Stevens' powerful statement
captures one of the majority's blunders that has led to state sovereign immunity
undermining both patent holders' rights and the patent system as a whole.
Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, pointed out that a
pattern of state patent infringement was evident, citing Chew v. California and
other cases as evidence.128 Addressing the majority's claim that the harm
identified by Congress was too speculative, Justice Stevens presented evidence
of the States' heavy involvement in the federal patent system, detailing lucrative
state licensing schemes and highlighting patent infringement suits brought
against and by the states.129 Furthermore, Stevens noted that the majority
encouraged patent holders to seek nearly non-existent and limiting state remedies
that required state judges, with little to no patent experience, to decide whether
the state infringed a patent or the patent was invalid. 130 Additionally, Stevens
125 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646-47. The Supreme Court noted that the statute's aims of
placing "States on the same footing as private parties" were appropriate under Article I of the
Constitution, but were unconstitutional after Seminole Tribe. Id. at 647-48. The majority
essentially concedes that the States were violating the constitutional tights of private parties,
but avoided the issue due to its holding in Seminole Tribe and C0 of Boerne. Although Seminole
Tribe dictates Congress' abrogation powers, Justice Ginsburg still believes that Congress can
validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause in Article I of the
Constitution. Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 46 n.1 (2012) ("I remain of the view
that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I Commerce
Clause power.'". Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsburg in Coleman. Id. at 46. Therefore,
the potential of reinstating Congress' power to abrogate under Article I likely rests with the
composition of the court.
126 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641 ("At most, Congress heard testimony that patent
infringement by States might increase in the future ... and acted to head off this speculative
harm.") (citations omitted).
127 Id. at 650, 652.
128 Id. at 655-656; see id. at 656-657 (citing numerous cases evidencing state patent
infringement and the increase in state patent infringement).
129 Id. at 656-58.
130 See id. at 658-59 n.11-12 (citations omitted) (highlighting Alabama, West Virginia,
Colorado, Minnesota, and Maryland state laws that either deny waiver of sovereign immunity
25
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acutely pointed out that Congress' clear preemption of state jurisdiction over
patent infringement and the Supreme Court's continued application and
acceptance of that preemption was an indication that state remedies "simply did
not exist."
131
c. The State's Right to Infringe Another's Patent without Repercussion
Stevens' dissent aptly articulated state sovereign immunity's invasion of
patent law, subtly recognizing the states' impending abuse of the patent system.
Ignoring the troublesome signs postulated in Stevens' dissent, strictly applying
the CiGy of Boerne test, and subordinating patent law to state sovereign immunity,
the majority provided the states with an almost impenetrable shield from patent
infringement. Florida Prepaid allowed state sovereign immunity to permeate
throughout patent law and neutralized Congress' reactionary legislation designed
to "putf States in the same position as all private users of the patent system
.... ,,132 Thus, the first state sovereign immunity right in patent law was created,
granting states the right to infringe another's patent without facing repercussions.
Next, the Supreme Court added a new right to the states' "bundle of rights" by
allowing the states to participate in the patent system as plaintiffs while
preserving nearly all their state sovereign immunity as defendants.
or significantly limit waiver to actions outside of patent infringement); idat 659 ("Even if such
remedies might be available in theory, it would have been 'appropriate' for Congress to
conclude that they would not guarantee patentees due process in infringement actions against
state defendants."); id. at 659 ("State judges have never had the exposure to patent litigation
that federal judges have experienced for decades ... [and] their decisions would not be
reviewable in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."). Convinced state remedies were
non-existent or at least inadequate throughout the nation, a professor during the Patent
Remedy Act congressional hearings noted that the Federal Circuit in Chew "assumes that such
state law remedies will be available in every state in which the patentee's product is sold." Id.
at 655-56 n. 7 (citation omitted). The professor continued, arguing that state remedies "would
vitiate a major goal of the federal intellectual property system: national uniformity." Id. "The
Acting Commissioner of Patents stated, "If States and their instrumentalities were immune
from suit in federal court for patent infringement, patent holders would be forced to pursue
uncertain, perhaps even non-existent, remedies under State law." Id. at 656 (citation omitted).
131 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 658 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338).
132 Id. at 663.
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C. THE STATE'S RIGHT TO REAP THE BENEFITS OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM WITHOUT CONSTRUCTIVELY WAIVING ITS
SOVEREIGN IMMUN1TY: COLLEGE SAVINGS V. FLORIDA
PREPAID
133
In College Savings v. Florida Prepaid ("College Savings'), a companion case to
Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court held that Florida Prepaid did not
constructively waive its right to state sovereign immunity simply by participating
in a nonessential interstate commerce activity.134 The United States government
argued that a state constructively waives its sovereign immunity right when it
"runs an enterprise for profit, operates in a field traditionally occupied by private
persons or corporations, [and] engages in activities sufficiently removed from
Icore' [state] functions. ' 135 The Court disagreed, holding that "constructive
waiver is little more than abrogation" in disguise.136 Overruling prior case law
that recognized constructive waiver, the Court held that waiver only occurs when
a state either voluntarily invokes federal jurisdiction or clearly and unequivocally
declares its intention to submit to federal jurisdiction.137 Although College Savings
involved trademark law, the holding was extended to patent law by the Supreme
Court in Florida Prepaid.138 Thus, the Supreme Court held that a state's
participation in patent law did not constructively waive state's right to sovereign
133 Col. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
This case involved the same parties in Florida Prepaid v. College Savings. Id. at 670-71. The case
addressed the Trademark Clarification Remedy Act ("TRCA"). Id. at 668 90. Similar to the
passage of the Patent Remedy Act, Congress passed the TRCA to abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity right with regard to trademark law. Id. at 670. College Savings argued that Florida
Prepaid violated trademark law because it made "misstatements about its own tuition savings
plans in its brochures and annual reports." Id. at 671.
134 Id. at 691. Interstate commerce is defined as, "[tirade and other business activities
between those located in different states; esp., traffic in goods and travel of people between
states." Commerce, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In College Savings, Florida Prepaid
allegedly engaged in interstate commerce by "selling and advertising a for-profit educational
investment vehicle" to citizens from different states. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 680.
135 College Savings, 527 U.S. at 679-80 (citation omitted). The United States government
"intervened to defend the constitutionality of the TRCA." Id. at 671.
136 Id. at 684.
137 See id. at 680 (overruling Parden v. Terminal R. Co. of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184
(1964)) ("Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled."); id. at 675-
76 (citing Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R, Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)) ("[W]e will find a
waiver [ if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction"); id. (citing Great Northern Life Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)) ("[Olr else if the State makes a 'clear declaration' that it
intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.").
138 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635
(1999)
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immunity.139 Accordingly, absent voluntary waiver, states can reap the benefits
of the patent system and at times avoid it.14° Following the Florid Prpaid and
College Savings decisions, the Federal Circuit adopted the strong presumption of
state sovereign immunity with regard to declaratory judgments.
D. THE STATE'S RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS PATENT LICENSEES
FROM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS: Al23 SYSTEMS V. HYDRO-
QUEBEC
141
In A 123 Systems v. ydro-,Quebec, A123 Systems ("A123' ) filed a declaratory
judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on April 7,
2006, "seeking a declaration of noninfringment and invalidity with respect to two
patents" asserted by the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System
("UT") and its licensee Hydro-Quebec ("HQ").142 In response, UT and HQ sued
139 College Savings, 527 U.S. at 691 (1999). Breyer vehemently opposed the majority's decision
in College Savings, arguing "When a State engages in ordinary commercial ventures, it acts like a
private person, outside the area of its 'core' responsibilities, and in a way unlikely to prove
essential to the fulfillment of a basic governmental obligation." Id. at 694. Breyer went on,
stating "A Congress that decides to regulate those state commercial activities rather than to
exempt the State likely believes that an exemption, by treating the State differently from
identically situated private persons, would threaten the objectives of a federal regulatory
program aimed primarily at private conduct." Id. at 694-95.
140 As mentioned before, states can waive their right to sovereign immunity when they
voluntarily file a patent infringement suit or a compulsory counterclaim in federal court. See
id. at 675-76 (citing Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)) (quoting
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,54 (1944)) ("Generally, we will find a waiver
either if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction ... or else if the state makes a 'clear
declaration' that it intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.'; see also Regents Of Univ. Of
New Mexico v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[W]hen a state files suit in
federal court to enforce its claims to certain patents, the state shall be considered to have
consented to have litigated in the same forum all compulsory counterclaims..
141 A123 Sys. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
142 Id. at 1215. "A declaratory judgment action-or DJ'-is most commonly employed by
alleged infringers or parties whom the patentee believes are infringing." NARD, supra note 73,
at 766. "The DJ allows the alleged infringer to take the initiative and assume greater control
over the litigation, particularly with respect to choice of venue." Id. To bring a DJ, the alleged
infringer must prove there is an "actual controversy" under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id.
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a)) (stating the statutory requirement to bring a declaratory judgment
action). Thus, the accused infringer must show that there is "an objectively reasonable
apprehension that [he] would be sued for infringement" of a patent. Int'l Med. Prosthetics
Research Assocs. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, 787 F.2d 572, 576 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In this case,
UT and HQ already sued A123, so there was an "objectively reasonable apprehension" that
A123 would be sued. A declaratory judgment action allows the accused patent infringer to file
a suit in its preferred court, granting it procedural advantages in the process. See Evan A.
Raynes, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Intellectual Propery, SYMBus, THE BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014),
http://symbus.com/blog/?p=483 ("[Sluing first may allow the accused party to select the
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A123 for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas on September 1, 2006.143 HQ also moved to dismiss
the declaratory action brought in Massachusetts because UT was a necessary and
indispensable party and "could not be joined as a defendant based on its ...
sovereign immunity."'144 Even though the declaratory judgment was filed first,
the Federal Circuit agreed with HQ and affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory
judgment.
145
1. UT Was a Necessary Party to A 123's Declaratory JudgmentAction
Patent owners can license their patents to a licensee in exchange for an annual
fee called a royalty.146 Licenses can be non-exclusive or exclusive. A non-
exclusive license is one that the patent owner can grant to multiple people or
companies;147 an exclusive license is one that the patent owner can only grant to
one person or one company.148 A patent owner can further limit an exclusive or
non-exclusive license by making it a "field of use" license, typically by limiting
the licensee to only make, use, sell, offer for sale, or import the patented
invention in a specific area of technology, science, or industry.
149
court where the litigation will occur."); id. ("[Sluing first may help the accused party obtain a
procedural advantage.').
143 A 123, 626 F.3d at 1216.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1219. "The general rule in patent cases is ... the forum of the first-filed case is
favored, unless considerations of judicial and litigant economy, and the just and effective
disposition of disputes, require otherwise." A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 657 F. Supp. 2d
276, 279 (D. Mass. 2009), affid, 626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In this case, the District Court
in Massachusetts deferred to the later-filed case because it could not administer an effective
disposition of the case without the state patent owner. See id. at 281 ("[It is appropriate for
the declaratory action, though first-filed, to yield to the Texas Action, where the court can
achieve a full resolution of the dispute without subjecting the parties to the risks inherent in
multiple lawsuits.").
146 Royaly, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("A payment - in addition to or in
place of an up-front payment - made to an author or inventor for each copy of a work or
article sold under a copyright or patent.").
147 License, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("A [nonexclusive] license of
intellectual-property rights that gives the licensee a right to use, make, or sell the licensed item
on a shared basis with the licensor and possibly other licensees.").
148 Id. ("A[n] [exclusive] license that gives the licensee the sole right to perform the licensed
act, often in a defined territory, and that prohibits the licensor from performing the licensed
act and from granting the right to anyone else.. 1').
149 Thus, there can be more than one exclusive licensee at a given time, if each license is
geographically limited or commercially limited by market segment. See R. CARL MOY, MOY's
WALKER ON PATENTS: SPECIFIC ACTS OF MISUSE--RESTRICTIONS ON LICENSEE'S FREEDOM
OF AcTON-TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS § 18:33 (4th ed. 2017). ("One relatively common
type of term that exists in licenses of patent rights are restrictions as to the location at which
29
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Under patent law, both non-exclusive and exclusive licensee with less than all
substantial rights in a patent, such as an field-of-use licensee, lack standing to sue
for infringement without joining the patent owner."50 "An accused infringer
must likewise join both the exclusive licensee and the patentee in a declaratory
action because the patentee is a necessary party."15' 1 InA123, the Federal Circuit
held that HQ was an exclusive licensee, but the license was restricted to specific
fields of use.152 Therefore, "UT [was] a necessary party to A123's declaratory
judgment action" because it retained substantial rights in the patent.'
5 3
2. State Sovereign Immuni_* Prevented A 123 from Joining UT
A123 argued that UT's voluntary participation in the Texas infringement suit
waived its right to state sovereign immunity.154 However, when a state or its
instrumentalities files a patent infringement suit, it only consents to litigation "in
the same forum [for] all compulsory counterclaims, i.e., those arising from the same
transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the state's asserted claims.' I 55 Thus, a "state
university's participation in one lawsuit does not amount to a waiver of immunity
in a separate lawsuit, even one involving the same patents."'15 6 Accordingly, A123
could not join UT to its declaratory action in the District Court of Massachusetts
because "UT's waiver of... immunity in a patent infringement suit in... Texas
did not result in a waiver of immunity" in A123's separate action.
15 7
the patent right may be exercised."); id., INDUSTRY OR COMMERCIAL FIELD LIMITATIONS
18:34 ("Another common type of license restriction addresses the industry or field of
commerce in which the patented invention can be employed. Thus, the patent owner may
permit the patented invention to be utilized in one type of application, but not others.'); see,
e.g.,A123, 626 F.3d at 1218 (exemplifying how an exclusive license can be limited to a specific
area of technology like "manufacturing] LiFePO4").
150 Id. at 1217 (citing Int'l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1278-79
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891)).
151 Id. (citing Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
152 See id. at 1217 ("[Ain exclusive license to... rechargeable batteries with a solid electrolyte,
gelled, plasticized or not plasticized, and . .. to manufacture and sell lithium iron phosphate
('LiFePO4') in bulk quantities for [various] applications.").
153 Id. at 1219.
154 Id.
155 Regents of Univ. of New Mexico v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cit. 2003)
(emphasis added).
156 A 123, 626 F.3d at 1219 (citing Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal., Dep't. of Health
Services, 505 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) ("[W]here a waiver of immunity occurs in one
suit, the waiver does not extend to an entirely separate lawsuit, even one involving the same
subject matter and the same parties.').
157 Id. at 1220.
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3. Dismissal Was Appropriate Because UT Was an Indispensable Pary
Finally, the Federal Circuit had to determine whether UT was an
indispensable party to the litigation.'5 8 "[W]hen joinder of a necessary party is
not feasible," the court determines whether the party is indispensable and
dismissal is appropriate by asking whether: (1) the judgment would prejudice the
absent or existing parties; (2) the prejudice "could be lessened or avoided"; (3)
the judgement would be adequate; and (4) dismissal would preclude the plaintiff
from seeking adequate remedies.15 9 If UT was a dispensable party, then A123
could proceed with its declaratory action against HQ alone.1 60 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the District Court of Massachusetts' dismissal of A123's
declaratory action because UT was an indispensable party.
161
Ruling on the first factor, the District Court of Massachusetts found that
retaining jurisdiction over A123's action would prejudice UT's interests in the
patents because the patents could be ruled invalid without the opportunity to
defend the patents.162 Touching on the third factor, the District Court "implicitly
found that a judgment without UT would be inadequate" because there was a
risk of multiple suits and diverging liabilities against A123's single act of
infringement.163 The Federal Circuit noted, "[b]ecause HQ is a field-of-use
licensee and UT has retained non-overlapping rights in the patents in suit, UT
may very well be able to assert infringement claims against A123 that HQ cannot,
creating the risk of multiple lawsuits and of inconsistent relief."' 164 Relying on the
fourth factor, the District Court found that A123 could seek adequate remedies
and defenses in the Texas infringement case filed by UT and HQ.165 Three of
the four factors proved that UT was an indispensable party and thus, the District
Court dismissed A123's declaratory action.
166
158 Id. at 1221.
159 Id. at 1220 (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 19(b)).
160 Id. (noting A123's argument that UT was a dispensable party and thus, the dismissal of
the case was improper).
161 Id. at 1222.
162 Id. at 1221.
163 Id. at 1222; id. at 1221 ("Specifically, the [district] court concluded that were it to reinstate
the action and declare the patents invalid, UT would lose all rights in its patents despite the
fact that it had no opportunity to defend its interests in the litigation.") (citation omitted).
164 Id. at 1222.
165 Id. ("[Finding that because UT has waived immunity to suit in Texas, A123 may assert
counterclaims for declaration of noninfringement and invalidity in that action.'.
166 Id.
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4.. The State's Right to Protect Its Patent Licensees from Declaratoy Judgments
A123 is a prominent example of states taking advantage of the Supreme
Court's absolute submission to state sovereign immunity that resulted from
Florida Prepaid and College Savings. After A 123, states had the power to infringe
others' patents without repercussions, enforce their patents, yield substantial
sums of money from lucrative licenses, and protect their licensees from
declaratory judgements in unfavorable forums. Justice Stevens' fear of the states'
undermining patent law was slowly taking shape. It was only a matter of time
before states used the holdings in Florida Prepaid, College Savings, and A123 to
avoid USPTO proceedings.
E. THE STATE'S RIGHTS IN IPR PROCEEDINGS
Based on the Supreme Court's aggressive application of state sovereign
immunity, it was likely that agency proceedings would feel the effects of Florida
Prpaid, College Savings, and A123.167 This section details the intrusion of state
sovereign immunity into agency proceedings and the eventual application of the
doctrine to USPTO proceedings. Coinciding with the drastic evolution of the
U.S. patent system and the explosion of technological innovation, the Supreme
Court once again decided to undermine patent law and Congress' attempt to
promote the "Progress of ... useful Arts. '168 These decisions represent he final
state sovereign immunity rights in patent law that motivated Allergan's attempt
to manipulate and circumvent the patent laws by renting sovereign immunity.
1. Background: State Sovereign Immunity's Dominance overAgengs Proceedings
a. Establishing when State Sovereign Immunity Applies to Agency
Proceedings: FMC v. South Carolina Ports Authority
169
In Federal Maritime Commissioner v. South Carolina State Ports Authoriy ("FMCD,
the Supreme Court held that state sovereign immunity precluded a federal agency
from "adjudicating a private party's complaint" against a state instrumentality.1
7 0
167 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); A123
Sys. Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
168 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
169 Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
170 Id. at 747; id. at 160 ("Given both this interest in protecting States' dignity and the strong
similarities between FMC proceedings and civil litigation, we hold that state sovereign
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FMC concerned the Federal Maritime Commission's administration of an
adjudicatory complaint filed by a private party against a state-ran shipping port
that violated the Shipping Act of 1984.171 Relying on the Hans presumption and
its Seminole Tribe decision, the Supreme Court reasoned:
[f]f the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's
dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private parties
in federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would have found
it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing
before the administrative tribunal of an agency .... 
172
The Supreme Court found a Hans presumption, holding that the state
instrumentality was entitled to state sovereign immunity because of the strong
similarities between civil litigation and a Federal Maritime Commission
proceeding.17 3 This broad application of state sovereign immunity to
administrative proceedings would eventually have a profound effect on patent
law, the USPTO's proceedings, and flexible and progressive Congressional
legislation.
b. Extending FMC to Patent Law: Vas-Cath v. Curators of Universio of
Missouri174
In 2007, the Federal Circuit followed the Supreme Court's FMC decision in
Vas-Cath v. Curators of the Universiy of Missouri.175 In Vas-Cath, the University of
Missouri initiated an interference proceeding, which the USPTO conducts when
two unrelated inventors file applications for patents on the same invention,17 6
171 Id. at 743.
172 Idat 760 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999)). The Hans presumption states
that "the Constitution was not intended to 'raise up' any proceedings against the States that
were 'anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted."' Id. at 755 (quoting
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890).
173 Id. at 756-59 (listing a number of similarities between a Federal Maritime Commission
proceeding and civil litigation). The agency's "Rules of Practice and Procedure" were strikingly
similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 757. Its discovery process and hearings
were nearly identical to discovery proceedings in federal civil litigation. Id. at 758. The role of
the administrative law judge, an "impartial officer designated to hear a case," was almost
indistinguishable from an Article II judge. Id. at 758-59.
174 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of the Univ. ofMo. (Vas-Cath), 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cit. 2007).
175 Id. at 1382.
176 "A patent interference proceeding, 35 U.S.C. 5 135, is conducted for the purpose of
determining priority of invention as between competing applicants for patent on the same
invention." Id. at 1378.
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after Vas-Cath's patent was issued while the University's patent was pending.
177
Based on the law at the time, only the first party to invent would be granted the
patent.78 The USPTO awarded the University of Missouri the patent, however,
and Vas-Cath appealed.179 The district court held that the University of Missouri
did not waive its right to sovereign immunity and therefore, dismissed the suit.
80
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the University expressly waived
its right to sovereign immunity when it voluntarily "invoked the statutory system
of agency adjudication of a contested claim to patent property."181 An
interference proceeding provides the losing party a statutory right to judicial
review.1 82 The University voluntarily petitioned for an interference proceeding
and thus waived its right to state sovereign immunity.
183
The more important aspect of this case is the Federal Circuit's adoption and
application of FMC in USPTO interference proceedings.'84 The Federal Circuit
noted that interference proceedings "involve adverse parties, examination and
cross-examination by deposition of witnesses, production of documentary
evidence, findings by an impartial federal adjudicator, and power to implement
the decision." 85 Therefore, the Federal Circuit's findings implied that states are
177 Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379.
178 See NARD, supra note 73, at 246 ("The process-within the USPTO-by which priority
is determined is called an interference.'). Prior to the enactment of the AIA, the first party to
invent would be granted priority over all others and thus, would be granted the patent. See id.
("Section 102 (g)(1) is the priority provision, which is invoked when two or more parties claim
the same invention .... each party involved in a priority contest is asserting he invented first,
is therefore asking the USPTO or a court to award priority of invention to him."). Following
the passage of the AIA in 2011 and its adoption on March 16, 2013, the first party to file a
patent is granted the patent. Id. at 246 n.5, 306 ("WTlhe AlA determines priority based on filing
date the first inventor to file a patent application claiming the invention is awarded the
patent."). For the purposes of this article, the "first to invent" concept is not important. What
is important is to focus on the similarities between an interference proceeding and civil
litigation.
179 Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379.
180 Id. at 1380.
181 Id. at 1383; see also New Hampshire v. Ramsey, 366 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen the
state voluntarily participated in a federal administrative forum whose action would be reviewed
in federal court, the state waived its immunity'); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of
Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (holding that a state defendant's voluntary removal of an action from
state to federal court waives sovereign immunity).
182 See Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1382 ("Mhe interference proceeding is a multi-part action with
appeal as of right, starting in the PTO and culminating in court.').
183 Id. at 1385 ("The University initiated and participated in the contested [USPTO]
interference against Vas-Cath; we conclude that the University cannot both retain the fruits of
that action and bar the losing party from its statutory right of review, even if that review is
conducted in federal court.').
184 Id. at 1382.
185 Id. (citations omitted).
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immune from USPTO interference proceedings, absent voluntary waiver.186
More importantly, the Federal Circuit applied the FMC test to determine when
a USPTO proceeding is subject to state sovereign immunity.187 Following the
Federal Circuit's Vas-Cath decision, the PTAB eventually found that states are
immune from IPR proceedings, absent voluntary waiver.1 88
2. The State's Right to Immunifrom IPR Proceedings
a. The Explosion in Patent Iitgation and the Passage of the American
Invents Act
Following the rapid growth in patent litigation from 1990 to 2011, "Congress
overhauled and expanded the PTO's processes for reconsidering the
patentability of' weak patents by passing the AA and creating the PTAB and
IPRs.189 An IPR allows a third party to challenge the validity of"1 or more claims
186 See id. (agreeing with the district court's findings that an interference proceeding strongly
resembles civil litigation). The Federal Circuit noted that contested interference proceedings
"bear strong similarities to civil litigation... and the administrative proceeding can indeed be
characterized as a lawsuit." Id. (citing FMC, 535 U.S. at 760) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Federal Circuit did not expressly hold that interference proceedings are subject
to state sovereign immunity. However, its adoption and application of FMC implies that the
Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that states are immune from interference
proceedings. Id. at 1382; see also Denuis Crouch, Sovereign Immuniy Excuses Universiy of Fkorda
From IPR Challenge,
PATENTLYO (Feb. 1, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/sovereign-university-
challenge.html (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) ("Following Supreme Court precedent from other areas of law, the Federal Circuit
held in Vas-Cath that Missouri's sovereign immunity allowed it to avoid an interference
proceeding.") (emphasis added); Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No.
1PR2016-1274 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (Paper 21 at 5) (noting that Vas-Cath applied FMCto
interference proceedings).
187 Id. at 1383.
188 See Covidien 473 F.3d at 39 (holding that a Florida entity was "entitled to assert its
sovereign immunity as a defense to the institution of an interpartes review.").
189 See Introduction, supra, see also, Covidien 473 F.3d at 20("In 2011, Congress overhauled
and expanded the PTO's processes for reconsidering the patentability of such claims. See AIA
§ 6. Enacted in response to "a growing sense that questionable patents are too easily obtained
and are too difficult to challenge," H.R. Rep. No. 98, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1, at 39 (2011)
(2011 House Report), the AA replaced interpartes reexamination with interpartes review, an
adversarial proceeding before the new Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or Board). See
35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq.; see also 35 U.S.C. 5 6. Congress created inter partes review to "establish
a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit
unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs." 2011 House Report at 40.').A great
example of weak patents are the RESTASIS patents. These patents originally expired in May
of 2014, but Allergan obtained the six new patents now at issue in the Allergan and Mylan
35
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of a patent only on n ground[s]" of novelty and obviousness.19 IPRs provide
defendants accused of patent infringement an alternative route to pursue an
invalidity challenge against the patents in suit.'91 If the defendant files a petition
for an IPR, then the patent owner can file a preliminary response arguing against
the institution of the IPR.192 The USPTO Director then decides whether "there
is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
1 of the claims challenged."'193 If the Director decides to institute an IPR, then a
panel of three PTAB administrative judges examine the validity of the challenged
patent.194 The IPR proceeding has several procedural intricacies, but it will end
with either the PTAB's termination of the IPR or a final written decision
regarding the validity of the patent.195 If the PTAB's makes final written decision,
then the Director will make a certification that cancels the challenged patent
claims.196 Inevitably, third parties and defendants petitioned seeking IPRs of
patents held by states.197 Predictably, the Federal Circuit and the PTAB
submitted to the overwhelming reach of state sovereign immunity.
198
cases that extended its exclusivity over the RESTASIS drug. William M.Jay & Jaime A. Santos,
Patent-Assignment Transactions Between Brand-Name Dig Companies and Native American Tribes Will
Undermine a Healthy Patent System and Harm Patients, Assoc. for Accessible Medicines 3
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017- 10/AAM%20White%
20Paper%2Renting/o20Tribal%201mmunity/o20to%20Evade%201PR%2O0Review%/o20of/
20Pharmaceutical%20Patents.pdf. These patents were weak because they "attempted to claim
essentially the same formulation and methods of treatment Allergan had previously claimed,
with a bit more detail about the proportions of ingredients." Id. at 3.
190 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). Additionally, an IPR is limited to "prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications." Id.
191 "A person who is not the owner of a patent may file ... [IPR]." 35 U.S.C. § 311 (a). Thus,
a patent infringement defendant may petition for an IPR as long as the petition is made less
"than 1 year after the date on which the [defendant] ... is served with a complaint alleging
infringement of the patent." Id. § 315(b).
192 35 U.S.C. § 312 (discussing how to file a petition); id. 313 (discussing a preliminary
response to a petition).
193 Id. 5 314(a).
194 Id. 5§ 6(c), 316(c).
195 Id. % 316, 317(a), 318(a).
196 Id. § 318(b).
197 See Part II.E.2.b, infra.
198 Id.
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a. Extending State Sovereign Immuniy to Inter Partes Reviews: Coidien
LP v. Universiy of Florida Research Foundation Incoporated99
In Covidien LP v. Universiy of Florida Research Foundation Inc., the PTAB
concluded that "the considerable resemblance" between IPR proceedings and
civil litigation was "sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to the States by
the Eleventh Amendment.' ' 2°° In a separate suit, the University of Florida
Research Foundation ("UFRF' ) filed an action in a Florida state court, alleging
that Covidien breached a licensing contract involving UFRF's patent.
20 1
Covidien filed three petitions requesting an IPR of UFRF's patent.20 2 Applying
the FMC standard adopted in Vas-Cath by the Federal Circuit, the PTAB
exhaustively compared IPR proceedings to civil litigation. 20 3 The PTAB noted
that "there are several similarities between civil litigation and interpartes review
that are not unlike those compared in Vas-Cath for interferences.' ' 2° 4 The PTAB
found that UFRF was a State of Florida instrumentality and thus, its patent was
immune from an IPR.205 Thus, states acquired immunity from IPR proceedings,
absent voluntary waiver. Realizing the power obtained from the PTAB's Covidien
decision, states began protecting their licensees from IPR proceedings.
199 Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274 (P.T.A.B. Jan.
25, 2017) (Paper 21).
200 Id. at 24.
201 Id. at 3 (citing Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, CASE NO. 1:16CV183-
MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3869877 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016)).
202 Id. at 4.
203 Id. at 24; see id. at 18-24 (discussing similarities between IPR and civil litigation petitions,
discovery, protective orders, APJs and Article III judges, and the APJs review of the merits).
The PTAB agreed with the UFRF that IPR proceedings are adversarial cases "routinely held
before panels of three impartial administrative patent judges (APJs), immune from political
influence, who serve a role functionally comparable to that of an Article II judge." Id. at 17-
18, 23-24. Additionally, UFRF and the PTAB pointed out that the APJ's powers to rule on
evidence, enforce procedural rules, exercise independent judgment, and compel testimony all
resemble civil litigation. Id. at 18, 22-23. Furthermore, IPR proceedings require both parties to
submit pleadings supporting their positions similar to pleadings submitted in civil litigation.
Id. at 20-21.
204 Id. at 24; see id. at 25 (noting that "the manner of discovery, adversarial nature of the
proceeding, role of the APJ, and the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence in an inter
partes review largely mirrors that involved in an interference proceeding.").
205 Id. at 39.
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3. The State's Right to Protect Its Patent Licensees from IPR Proceedings:
Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Ballimore2 6
In NeochordInc. v. University ofMayland, Balimore, the PTAB dismissed the IPR
proceeding against Harpoon Medical, University of Maryland, Baltimore's
("UMB") licensee, because UMB raised its state sovereign immunity defense,
could not be joined to the proceeding, and was a necessary and indispensable
party.207 UMB concocted its argument by combining the Federal Circuit's
holding in A 123 and the PTAB's Covidien decision.208 The PTAB's findings that
state sovereign immunity applied to IPR proceedings were nearly identical to the
ones presented in Covidien.20 9 UMB argued that it retained substantial rights in
the patent because it "retain [ed] the right to sue a third party for infringement if
Harpoon Medical fail[ed] to do so."'210 Additionally, UMB could "license the '386
patent to government agencies, universities, educational institutions, and certain
non-profit entities." 211 Thus, UIMB could not be joined due to its state sovereign
immunity, and the case was dismissed because UMB was a necessary and
indispensable party.212 Neochord represents the state's right to protect its licensee
from IPR proceedings. This was the last right in the bundle that Allergan needed
to effectively carry out its plan to manipulate and circumvent patent law.
F. THE BUNDLE OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY RIGHTS IN
PATENT LAW: ESTABLISHING ALLERGAN'S FOUNDATION TO
CIRCUMVENT JPR PROCEEDINGS
Stevens' fears expressed in his Florida Prepaid dissent over the states'
increasing involvement in patent law and the unfair advantages granted by the
Florida Prepaid majority were finally coming to fruition. From Florida Prepaid to
Neochord, the Supreme Court's vast expansion of state sovereign immunity armed
the states with a powerful bundle of rights: (1) the right to avoid patent
infringement; (2) the right to reap the benefits of the patent system without
constructively waiving the right to state sovereign immunity; (3) the state's right
206 Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, CASE NO. IPR2016-00208 (P.T.A.B. May
23, 2017) (Paper 28).
207 Id. at 20.
208 See id. at 4, 19 (professing arguments nearly identical to the ones presented in Covidien and
relying on A 123 to show that the licensee possessed "less than 'substantially all' rights" in the
patent at issue).
209 See id. at 4-7 (using the FMC standard and the Federal Circuit's Vas-Cath decision to find
that state sovereign immunity applies to IPR proceedings).
210 Id. at 19.
211 Id.
212 Id. (applying the A 123 standard used by the Federal Circuit).
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to protect its patent licensees from declaratory judgments; (4) the right to
immunity from IPR proceedings; and (5) the state's right to protect its patent
licensees from 1PR proceedings.
Recognizing the advantages of state patent owners, and relying on the
presumption that Coviddien and Neochord applied to tribal sovereign immunity,213
Allergan assigned its RESTASIS patents to the Mohawk Tribe in hopes of
protecting its patents from IPR proceedings based on tribal sovereign
immunity.214 Allergan's strategy is essentially an attempt to rent tribal sovereign
immunity to circumvent an IPR proceeding.215 Part III explores Allergan's
strategy and the PTAB's decision. Part III ends by examining an alternate strategy
of monetizing state sovereign immunity.
IV. MONETIZING TRIBAL AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN PATENT
LAW: AN ATTEMPT To NEUTRALIZE THE PATENT DEATH SQUAD2 16
Facing challenges to the validity of its RESTASIS patents in an IPR
proceeding, Allergan decided to "rent" the bundle of state sovereign immunity
rights in patent law.217 Allergan's strategy can be summed up in three steps: (1)
213 See Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (Mylan 1), No. IPR2016-01127, 7-
8 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (Paper 130 at 7-8) (noting that the Mohawk Tribe and Allergan
relied on FMC, Covidien, and Neochora).
214 Allergan Press Release, supra note 10 ("The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe and its counsel
approached Allergan with a sophisticated opportunity to strengthen the defense of our
RESTASIS® intellectual property in the upcoming interpartes review proceedings before the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board...").
215 See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Allergan 1), No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017
WL 4619790, slip op. at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) ("[1In reality [Allergan] has paid the Tribe
to allow Allergan to purchase-or perhaps more precisely, to rent-the Tribe's sovereign
immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the PTO.') (emphasis added).
216 Patent owners refer to the PTAB as the patent death squad because of the number of
patents the PTAB has essentially killed. See Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads:
Are All Commerzay Viable Patents Invaid?, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-
patents-invalid/id=48642/ ("These bleak statistics have lead Federal Circuit Chief Judge
Randall Rader to at the AIPIA annual meeting in October 2013 call the PTAB 'death squads
killing property rights."').
217 See Mylan I No. IPR2016-01127 at 7-8 (noting that the Mohawk Tribe and Allergan relied
on FMC, Covidien, and Neochor). See discussion of the dispute between Allergan and Mylan
infra Part III.B.2. HoweverJudge William C. Bryson, a Federal Circuit judge temporarily sitting
in the Eastern District of Texas District Court, issued an opinion regarding the joinder of the
Mohawk Tribe to the ongoing litigation between Allergan and Mylan. Allergan I, 2017 WL
4619790 he stated, "[lit is clear that Allergan's motivation for the assignment was to attempt
to avoid the IPR proceedings that are currently pending in the PTO by invoking the Tribe's
sovereign immunity as a bar to those proceedings." Id. at *2. He noted, "[fIn reality [Allergan]
has paid the Tribe to allow Allergan to purchase--or perhaps more precisely, to rent-the
39
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assign a patent to a sovereign entity; (2) acquire an unrestricted, exclusive license
to the patent from the sovereign entity; and (3) have the sovereign entity invoke
its immunity to obtain dismissal of an IPR proceeding against the patent.
218 For
efficiency, this strategy can be referred to as the assign-license-immunize strategy
or the "ALl strategy." This is basically an attempt to neutralize the P'TAB, better
known as the "Patent Death Squad.'219 However, Allergan's monetization of
sovereign immunity in patent law has vast implications for IPR proceedings and
the public at large.220 Part III explores Allergan's ALI strategy, the PTAB's
reaction to the Al strategy with regards to tribal sovereign immunity, and the
implications of monetizing tribal sovereign immunity in patent law. Additionally,
Part III looks at Congressional response to the ALl strategy and the alternative
option of monetizing state sovereign immunity in patent law.
A. OBTAINING APPROVAL FROM THE FEDERAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION
AND THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Before addressing the RESTASIS IPR proceedings, it is important to
understand the terminology and processes pertaining to the underlying suit. This
section briefly discusses the process of obtaining Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval for a new drug and highlights specific areas of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the "Hatch-Waxman
Act") that gave rise to the dispute.221
Tribe's sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the PTO." Id.
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Judge Bryson stated, "WTlhe Court has serious doubts that the
transaction in which Allergan has sought to obtain immunity from inter partes review by the
PTO in exchange for payments to the Tribe is the kind of transaction to which the Tribe's
sovereign immunity was meant to extend." Id. at *3. Ultimately, Judge Bryson makes it readily
apparent that Allergan is attempting to rent tribal sovereign immunity to avoid IPR
proceedings against its RESTASIS patents.
218 See Allergan Press Release, supra note 10 (announcing the assignment of RESTASIS
patents to the Mohawk Tribe, the acceptance of a license back from the Mohawk Tribe, and
the Mohawk Tribe's motion to dismiss based on tribal sovereign immunity); Alkrgan 1, 2017
WL 4619790, slip op. at *2 ('What Allergan seeks is the right to continue to enjoy the
considerable benefits of the U.S. patent system without accepting the limits that Congress has
placed on those benefits through the administrative mechanism for canceling invalid
patents.").
219 See Sterne & Quinn, supra note 216 (defining the patent death squad as the PTAB).
220 See Allergan, Inc. (Allergan 1), No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790 ("[S]overeign
immunity should not be treated as a monetizable commodity that can be purchased by private
entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal responsibilties.").
221 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360 (2012) (codifying the Hatch-Waxman Act in the code of federal
regulations); see also 35 U.S.C. §5 156, 271, 282 (2012) (describing how the Hatch-Waxman Act
interacts with patent law).
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1. FDA Approval Process: New Drug Applicalions
Allergan is a brand name pharmaceutical company ("brand name company")
that develops, manufactures, markets, and sells brand name drugs.222 Before
marketing a new drug, brand name companies must file a New Drug Application
("NDA") with the FDA.223 The NDA proves to the FDA that the new drug "is
safe and effective for its proposed indications."224 Gaining FDA approval for a
new drug can be a lengthy and costly process due to the extensive clinical trials
required.225 However, once the FDA approves the NDA, the brand name
company can market and sell the drug to the public. 226 Brand name companies
that receive FDA approval for a drug and own patents preserving its exclusivity
over the drug wield substantial power to limit access to that drug through prices
222 See ALLERGAN, COMPANY PROFILE: LEADING GROWTH PHARMA,
https://www.allergan.com/about/ company-profile (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) ("Allergan is
focused on developing, manufacturing and commercializing branded pharmaceutical, device,
biologic, surgical and regenerative medicine products for patients around the world.").
3 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Allergan 1l), No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL
4803941, slip op. at *13 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
224 Id. Filing an NDA and garnering approval is a lengthy process that goes beyond the
bounds of this article. For a detailed explanation of how the RESTASIS drug was approved
by the FDA, see Allergan II, 2017 WL 4803941, slip op. at *5-9.
225 See Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost ofInventing New Drugs, FoRmls (Feb. 10,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/1 0 the-truly-staggering-
cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/#508fld14a948 ("the average cost of bringing a new drug to
market is $1.3 billion ..."); Aaron E. Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New
Estimate Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.c
om/2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-the-real-costs-of-developing-a-new-drug.html ("In
2010, a systematic review of studies that looked at the cost of drug development.., found 13
articles, with estimates ranging from $161 million to $1.8 billion (in 2009 dollars)"); NEW
DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS: FDA APPROVALS, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/fda-
approval -process.html ("It takes on average 12 years and over US$350 million to get a new
drug from the laboratory onto the pharmacy shelf."); U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
HIV/AIDS: How LONG DOES THE FDA TAKE TO APPROVE A DRUG?,
https://www.hiv.va.gov/patient/crinical-trials/drug-approval-process.asp ("It usually takes
about 10 years for a drug to be developed and approved for prescription."). The total cost of
developing a drug, including acquiring FDA approval, is debatable, but the costs are still high
when considering time value of money.
226 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NiEw DRUG APPLICATION (NDA) (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandA
pproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm ("The NDA
application is the vehicle through which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA
approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S.").
41
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and manufacturing.227 To increase public access to drugs through competition,
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act.
228
2. The Hatch-Waxman Act: Increasing PublicAccess, but Creating Liliga/ion2
29
The Hatch-Waxman Act offers generic drug companies the option to file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") to market generic drugs.230 An
ANDA improves competitiveness in the market by decreasing the cost and time
required for FDA approval.231 An ANDA is less costly and takes less time for
FDA approval because it relies "on the safety and efficacy studies previously
227 See Aaron Berman et al., Curbing Unfair Drug Prices: A Primer for States, GLOB. HEALTH
JUST. PARTNERSHIP YALE L. SCH. & YALE SCH. PUB. HEALTH NAT'L PHYSICIANS ALLIANCE
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FOUND. CONN. (Aug. 2017) ("Instead, inflated drug prices are a
result of drug manufacturers' power to charge whatever price the market will bear."); Allergan
II, 2017 WL 4803941, slip op. at *13 (noting the need to balance the monopoly granted to
pharmaceutical brand name drug companies by creating competition in the Hatch-Waxman
statute, infra.); see, e.g., Melody Petersen, Here's Why Drug Prices Rise Even When There's Plenty of
Competition, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mylan-price-
hikes-20160830-snap-story.html ("The [EpiPen] drug's patent expired decades ago, but Mylan
holds a patent on the automatic injection device. Mylan made EpiPen into its first billion-
dollar product through the price hikes and by spurring demand.').
228 See Allergan II, 2017 WL 4803941, slip op. at *13 (citing Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail
Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) ("The Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to strike
a balance between two competing policy interests: (1) to induce pioneering research and
development of new drugs; and (2) to enable competitors to bring low-cost generic copies of
those drugs').
- See 21 U.S.C. § 355, 360 (2012) (codifying the Hatch-Waxman Act in the code of federal
regulations); 35 U.S.C. 55 156, 271, 282 (2012) (describing how the Hatch-Waxman Act
interacts with patent law); see also Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hateh-Waxman
Act. Encouraging Innovation and Generic Drug Competition, FINNEGAN 9 (Winter 2010) ("As
pharmaceutical research and development continues, and as generic drug applications increase
in number, it is likely that there will be a corresponding increase in patent litigation as a means
of resolving patent rights.').
230 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2012) (describing the steps necessary to file an ANDA). Generic Drug
companies offer drugs that are "comparable to an innovator drug product in dosage form,
strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use." U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TYPES OF APPLICATIONS: ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG
APPLICATION (ANDA) (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprov
alProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovaApplications/AbbreviatedNew
DrugApplicationANDAGenerics/default.htm. Essentially, generic drugs are copies of the
innovator or brand name drug [hereinafter EXPLAINiNG FDA ANDA APPLICATIONS].
231 See Sokal & Gerstenblith, supra note 229, at 8 (noting that ANDAs were created to
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submitted as part of the" brand name company's NDA.232 To take advantage of
those studies, the generic company that files an ANDA must "scientifically
demonstrate that their product is [sic] performs in the same manner as the [brand
name] drug.' '233 Typically, generic companies demonstrate this through
bioequivalence or the "time it takes the generic drug to reach the bloodstream in
healthy volunteers.'234 FDA approval is granted when the generic company can
show that its generic drug "deliver[s] the same amount of active ingredients into
a patient's bloodstream in the same amount of time as the innovator."235
Additionally, an ANDA requires the generic company to request one of four
certifications that relate to patents published in a book tided Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the "Orange
Book. '236 The Orange Book lists each NDA drug along with its corresponding
patents.237 For example, the RESTASIS drug is listed in the Orange Book with
its six corresponding patents.238 The fourth certification ("Paragraph 1V
Certification") states, "that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted.'239 Requesting a Paragraph IV Certification notifies the FDA that the
generic company plans to manufacture, use, and/or sell the genetic drug before
the listed patents expire.240 Statutorily, a generic company's decision to make a
Paragraph IV Certification is in itself an act of infringement and requires the
232 Id. Unlike a brand name company that files an NDA, generic companies filing ANDAs
are generally "not required to include precinical [animal] and clinical [human] safety and
efficacy testing." EXPLAINING FDA ANDA APPLICATIONS, supra note 230.
233 EXPLAINING FDA ANDA APPLICATIONS, supra note 230.
2 Id.
235 Id.
236 See 21 U.S.C. 5 355()(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (2012) (requiring a generic company to select
between four certifications when filing an ANDA); see also, Sokal & Gerstenblith, supra note
229, at 6 ("A second valuable notice provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act requires that
ANDA-applicants make one of four 'certifications' with respect to each patent listed in the
Orange Book for the particular drug to which the ANDA is directed.').
237 See Sokal & Gerstenblith, supra note 229, at 6 (citing 21 U.S.C. 5 3550)(7)(A)(i)-(ili) (2006))
("The FDA publishes the patent information in a book titled Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly referred to as the 'Orange Book' because its
original cover was orange.") (emphasis added).
238 F.D.A.
ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS, PATENT AND EXCLUSIVITY FOR: NDA
050790, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent-info.cfm?ProductNo=0
01&AppLNo=050790&Appl type=N (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (listing the six RESTASIS
patents in the Orange Book).
-39 21 U.S.C. 5 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
240 See Sokal & Gerstenblith, supra note 229, at 7 ("If, however, an applicant wishes to obtain
FDA approval during the term of a listed patent, it must make a paragraph IV certification.").
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generic company to provide the brand name company with a "detailed statement
of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is
invalid or will not be infringed."'241 After receiving notice of the challenge to its
patent(s), the brand name company has forty-five days to file a patent
infringement suit against the generic company.242 If the brand name company
files a suit against the ANDA applicant, then Hatch-Waxman litigation ensues
and the generic company's ANDA is put on hold at the FDA.243 If the generic
company loses the case, it must wait until the patents expire before marketing its
generic drug.244 If it wins, it can seek FDA approval right away.
245
B. FRAMING THE ALLERGAN AND MYLAN DISPUTE246
1. The Lucrative RESTASIS Drug and Patents
Allergan's RESTASIS drug is an eye drop that "help[s] increase [the] eyes'
natural ability to produce tears, which may be reduced by inflammation due to
Chronic Dry Eye. ' 247 Allergan has six patents on the RESTASIS drug that grant
it the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, and
241 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(1); see also Sokal &
Gerstenblith, supra note 229, at 6 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)) ("The Hatch-
Waxman Act requires that when an applicant makes a paragraph IV certification, the applicant
must provide notice of such certification to the patent owner and holder of the NDA for the
branded drug to which the ANDA applies.").
242 21 U.S.C. 5 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
243 See 21 U.S.C. 5 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012) (requiring the FDA to hold approval of the genetic
drug while the court decides on the infringement action and invalidity challenge); see also, Sokal
& Gerstenblith, supra note 229, at 6 ("If, however, the patent owner files suit within 45 days,
the FDA is prohibited from approving the ANDA for 30 months .... ').
244 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (A) (2006) (noting that if the generic loses the Hatch-Waxman
Litigation, then "the court shall order the effective date of any approval of the drug or
veterinary biological product involved in the infringement to be a date which is not earlier
than the date of the expiration of the patent which has been infringed").
245 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 0)(5)(B)(ii)(I)(aa) ("[f... the district court decides that the patent
is invalid or not infringed.., the approval shall be made effective on. the date on which the
court enters judgment reflecting the decision").
246 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Allergan 1), No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL
4619790, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017); Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Allergan
I), No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 Wi. 4803941, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017); Mylan
Pharm., Inc. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe (Mylan 1), Case IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23,
2018) (Paper 130).
247 RESTAsis, APPROVED USE, https://www.restasis.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2018); see also
Allergan I1, 2017 WL 4803941, slip op. at *1 ("Dry eye is a progressive condition that afflicts a
substantial number of ophthalmic patients. It can cause great discomfort and sometimes leads
to serious complications that can threaten the patient's eyesight.").
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importing the drug.248 Allergan earned nearly $1.5 billion in revenue in 2016 from
sales of the RESTASIS drug.249 Thus, attacks Allergan's patents and exclusive
rights over the RESTASIS drug would have serious implications for the
company.
2. Attacks on the RESTASIS Patents
In 2015, Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Mylan Inc. (collectively, "Mylan"),
a generic drug company, filed an ANDA application seeking FDA approval,
indicating that it intended to manufacture and sell a generic version of the
RESTASIS drug prior to the patents' expiration.250 Mylan made the Paragraph
IV Certification in its ANDA application.25' After receiving notification from
Mylan of its Paragraph IV Certification, Allergan filed a patent infringement
action against Mylan under the Hatch-Waxman Act and section 271 (e)(2) of Tide
35, asserting that the filing of an ANDA with that certification was an act of
infringement.2 2 In response, Mylan argued that the RESTASIS patents were
248 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, ORANGE- BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUJVALENCE EVALUATIONS, PATENT AND ExCLUSIVITY FOR: NDA
050790, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patentinfo.cfm?ProductNo=0
01&ApplNo=050790&Appltype=N (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (listing the six RESTASIS
patents in the Orange Book); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (quoting Seymour v. Osbome, 11 Wall. 516, 533 (1871); accord, Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1998)) ("Specifically, patents are 'public franchises'
that the Government grants 'to the inventors of new and useful improvements."').
249
See ALLI;RGAN, INVESTORS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-
reuters/allergan -reports-strong-2016-finish-with-7-increas (noting that Allergan netted
$1.4195 billion in revenue from selling RESTASIS in 2016).
250 See Aleigan H1, 2017 WL 4803941, slip op. at *13 ("Allergan alleged that all four
defendants had infringed the Restasis patents under section 271(e)(2) of Title 35 by filing
Abbreviated New Drug Applications ("ANDAs") for drugs bioequivalent to Restasis.").
251 See id. at *1 ("The defendants ... Mylan, Inc.; and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., are
generic drug manufacturers that wish to manufacture and sell bioequivalent drugs having the
same components as Restasis. Their principal contention is that the claims asserted by Allergan
are invalid.").
252 See id. at *13 ("Allergan alleged that all four defendants had infringed the Restasis patents
under section 271 (e)(2) of Title 35 by filing Abbreviated New Drug Applications ("ANDAs")
for drugs bioequivalent to Restasis."). Allergan also filed suits against Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. and Akorn, Inc. after both companies also filed an ANDA application and requested
Paragraph IV Certification. Id. at *1. However, Mylan represents nearly identical interests.
Therefore, it is appropriate to ignore the other defendants in this dispute. Additionally, Judge
Bryson issued two opinions pertaining to Allergan's Hatch-Waxman litigation, the validity of
the RESTASIS patents, and the joinder of the Mohawk Tribe. Allergan 1, 2017 WL 4619790,
slip op.; Allergan II, 2017 WIL 4803941, slip op. Although these opinions are not discussed in
detail, they are helpful for background. Particularly, in Alergan 1, Judge Bryson points out his
45
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invalid and unenforceable and thus did not infringe the patents.25 3 Additionally,
Mylan petitioned to institute an IPR against the RESTASIS patents.25 4 The
PTAB instituted the IPR proceeding against the RESTASIS patents on
December 8, 2016.255 If Mylan could prove that the RESTASIS patents are
invalid, then Allergan would lose its right to exclude others from manufacturing
and selling its blockbuster drug. Facing the possible death of its valuable
RESTASIS patents, Allergan employed the ALI strategy.25
6
concern with the monetization of sovereign immunity in patent law. See Allegan 1, 2017 WL
4619790, slip op. at *3 ("[S]overeign immunity should not be treated as a monetizable
commodity that can be purchased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal
responsibilities.').
253 See Aleigan 1!, 2017 WL 4803941, slip op. at * 13 ("The defendants answered that the
Restasis patents are invalid on several grounds, and that none of the defendants infringe the
Restasis patents."). For purposes of this article, the details concerning the invalidity challenges
and decisions are irrelevant See id. at *17-60 (discussing the invalidity challenges and holding
RESTASIS patent claims invalid).
254 See Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., Case 1PR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2016)
(Paper 8) (instituting the IPR against the RESTASIS patents). Defendants filed IPRs in
response to a patent infringement suit hoping the "Patent Death Squad" or the PTAB would
invalidate portions or all of the patent(s) at issue in the federal district court. See Susan Decker,
Patent Death Squad' Pitting Tech and Pharma Heads to Supreme Court, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27,2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-27/patent-death-squad-pitting-tech-
and-pharma-heads-to-high-court ("Critics call the review board a 'death squad' because it uses
a different legal standard than courts and is more likely to cancel a patent.'); Anton Hopen,
Supreme Court and Patent Death Squad, SMITH & HOPEN (Nov. 28, 2017), https://
www.smithhopen.com/news-detail/677/Supreme-Court-and-Patent-Death-Squad ("Most
IPRs petitions are filed by patent infringement defendants. Typically, a company is sued for
patent infringement and within one year, the defendant files an IPR petition.'). TPRs provide
the defendant an additional forum to invalidate the patents at issue. Justin Oliver & Michael
Scerbo., Is PTAB 'death squad' just a myth?, FITZPATRICK (June 2015), https://
www.fitzpatrickcella.com/wpcontent/uploads/IS%20PTAB%20death/20squad ... oliver.be
rschadsky.scerbo IPM2015.pdf ("[IPRs] they pit a petitioner seeking to invalidate a patent
against the respondent owner'). Additionally, defendants prefer IPR proceedings over federal
district court proceedings to invalidate patents because the standard to invalidate a patent is
lower, the proceedings are resolved faster, and the overall cost is lower. See Decker, supra
(noting that IPRs are "designed to be a low-cost alternative to lawsuits'); Hopen, supra ("While
granted patents are presumed valid by a clear and convincing standard, instituted IPR
proceedings lowered that standard to a 'preponderance."').
255 See Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., Case TPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2016)
(Paper 8) (instituting the IPR against the RESTASIS patents).
256 See Alkrgan 1, 2017 WL 4619790, slip op. at *2 ("Mt is clear that Allergan's motivation
for the assignment was to attempt to avoid the IPR proceedings that are currently pending in
the PTO by invoking the Tribe's sovereign immunity as a bar to those proceedings.'). Mylan
specifically noted that Allergan 'has admitted in other forums that the intent is to employ
Native American sovereign immunity and attempt to cut-off pending validity challenges with
the Patent Office."' Id. at *1 (citation omitted). Additionally, Mylan argued that "'Allergan is
attempting to misuse Native American sovereignty to shield invalid patents from
cancellation."' Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
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C. ALLERGAN'S EMPLOYMENT OF THE ALl STRATEGY: AN ATTEMPT TO
MAKE STATE AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY COEXTENSIVE
The ALl strategy consists of (1) assigning a patent to a sovereign entity; (2)
acquiring an unrestricted exclusive license to the patent in return; and (3) having
the sovereign entity invoke sovereign immunity to obtain dismissal of an IPR
proceeding against the patent. First, Allergan assigned the RESTASIS patents to
the Mohawk Tribe on September 8, 2017.257 "On the same day, the [Mohawk]
Tribe and Allergan also entered into a Patent License Agreement ('License). '258
Finally, on September 22, 2017, the Mohawk Tribe filed a motion to dismiss the
IPR proceeding against the RESTASIS patents "for Lack of Jurisdiction Based
on Tribal Sovereign Immunity. '259 Allergan's employment of the ALl strategy
raised two important questions: (1) whether tribal sovereign immunity was
coextensive with state sovereign immunity and applied to IPR proceedings; and
(2) whether the Mohawk Tribe was an indispensable party that retained
substantial rights in the RESTASIS patents.260 The PTAB answered both
questions in the negative.
261
1. The PTAB's Denial of Mohawk's Motion: Tribal and State Sovereign
Immunity Are Not Coextensive and Allergan was the Effective Patent Owner
in Interest.
Relying heavily on FMC, Covidien, and Neochord, Allergan and the Mohawk
Tribe argued that the PTAB lacked jurisdiction over the Mohawk Tribe and the
IPR proceeding should be dismissed because the Mohawk Tribe was an
indispensable party that was immune from IPR proceedings.262 The PTAB
determined that tribal and state sovereign immunity were not coextensive, that
257 Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (Mylan 1), Case IPR2016-01127
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (Paper 130 at 2).
258 Id. at 6.
259 Id. at 2-3.
2W See id. at 40 ("[W]e determine that the Tribe has not established that it is entitled to assert
its tribal immunity in these interpartes review proceedings ... [and] these proceedings may
continue with Allergan as the patent owner, and that the Tribe is not an indispensable party
to these proceedings.").
261 Id.
262 See id. at 7 ("Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in [FMC], the Tribe seeks to
terminate these proceedings on the basis of its tribal sovereign immunity."); id. at 7-8 ("The
Tribe further relies upon certain prior Board decisions applying FMCs holding with respect
to state sovereign immunity in the context of inter partes review proceedings.") (citing
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Case IPR2016-01274 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25,
2017) (Paper 21)); Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Case IPR2016-00208 (P.T.A.B. May 23,
2017) (Paper 28).
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tribal sovereign immunity was inapplicable to IPR proceedings, and that Allergan
retained sufficient ownership interest in the RESTASIS patents to continue the
IPR proceeding without the Mohawk Tribe.263 A detailed representation of the
PTAB's decision is important to fully understand Allergan's employment of the
ALl strategy, the differences between state and tribal sovereign immunity, and
the Congressional egislation that resulted from the case.
a. Tribal and State Sovereign Are Not Coextensive and Tribes Are Not
Immunefrom IPR Proceedings
First, the PTAB established a bright line between tribal and state sovereign
immunity.264 The PTAB definitively pointed out that neither the federal courts
nor the PTAB have extended the FMC holding to tribal sovereign immunity, that
the FMC decision was narrowly tailored to state sovereign immunity, and that
the decisions the Mohawk Tribe relied on to support its argument were
nonbinding, unpersuasive, and inapplicable.265 Second, the PTAB's decision
focused on tribal sovereign immunity's subservience to "the superior and plenary
control of Congress," including IPR proceedings.266 Whereas Congress may
sometimes explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity by way of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, tribal sovereign immunity is beholden to "Acts of
Congress ... in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary.
' 267 The Patent
263 See id. at 40 ("[R]efusing to equate tribal to state sovereign immunity and denying the
motion we determine that the Tribe has not established that it is entitled to assert its tribal
immunity in these interpartes review proceedings ... [and] these proceedings may continue
with Allergan as the patent owner, and that the Tribe is not an indispensable party to these
proceedings.").
264 See id. at 9 ("[T]he Supreme Court has stated that 'the immunity possessed by Indian
Tribes is not co-extensive with that of the States."') (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg.
Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)).
265 See id. at 8 (noting that the Mohawk Tribe failed to "point to any federal court or [PTAB]
precedent suggesting that FMCs holding with respect to state sovereign immunity can or
should be extended ... [to] tribal immunity.'); id. at 7 ("As noted by the Tribe, the Supreme
Court in FMC 'held that State sovereign immunity extends to adjudicatory proceedings before
federal agencies that are of a type... from which the Framers would have thought the States
possessed immunity when they agreed to enter the Union."') (citing the Mohawk Tribe's
motion to dismiss the IPR proceeding); i. at 8 (citing the Mohawk Tribes motion to dismiss
the TPR proceeding) ("the Tribe cites certain administrative decisions of other federal agencies
to assert that '[t]he principal [sic] that sovereign immunity shields against adjudicatory
proceedings has been extended to tribes.' al We are not bound by those agency decisions, but
even those decisions do not squarely address the issue.').
266 Id. at 11 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)) (internal
quotations omitted) (noting the general applicability of IPRs to tribes).
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Act authorizes the USPTO to "grant a patent limited in scope to patentable claims
and to reconsider the patentability of those claims via interpartes review."
268
Third, the PTAB decided that IPR proceedings did not fall within the Ninth
Circuit's limited exceptions immunizing tribes from a "generally applicable
federal statute.' 269 The Ninth Circuit's exceptions included: (1) "exclusive rights
of self-governance in purely intramural matters"; (2) the law that would violate
tribal rights "guaranteed by Indian treaties"; and (3) legislative history proving
that Congress intentionally made the law inapplicable to tribes.270 The Mohawk
Tribe's exclusive rights of self-governance were not impeded by its entry into a
commercial transaction with entities outside the tribe and the IPR proceeding
concerned external relations that would not affect its social order.271
Furthermore, IPR proceedings do not circumvent or impede rights guaranteed
by Indian treaties and legislative history did not exemplify Congress' intent to
exempt the tribes from IPR proceedings.272 Again, state sovereign immunity may
sometimes be expressly abrogated by Congress under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, whereas federal statutes are generally applicable to
tribes unless otherwise noted by Congress.
Fourth, the PTAB tacked its decision to "its independent role in ensuring the
correctness of granting patentable claims. ' 27 3 This allowed the PTAB to
distinguish tribal sovereign immunity from state sovereign immunity in several
ways. Unlike the Framers' intent to exempt states from IPR proceedings, the
Framers did not intend to exempt tribes from IPR proceedings.274 The PTAB
268 Id. at 12 (citing MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1289 (Fed.
Cit. 2015)) (noting that the USPTO has the authority to "correct or cancel an issued patent"
through IPR).
269 See id. at 13-14 (quoting Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir.
1994)) ("Mhe Ninth Circuit has noted that 'tribal sovereignty does not extend to prevent the
federal government from exercising its superior sovereign powers."').
270 Id. at 12-13 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th
Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
271 See id. (citing San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1312-13 (D.C.
Cir. 2007)) ("[W]hen a tribal government goes beyond matters of internal self-governance and
enters into off-reservation business transaction with non-Indians, its claim of sovereignty is at
its weakest"); id. at 13 (citing NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov't, 788
F.3d 537, 550 (6th Cir. 2015)) ("The tribes' retained sovereignty reaches only that power
'needed to control ... internal relations[,] ... preserve their own unique customs and social
order[, and] ... prescribe and enforce rules of conduct for [their] own members."') (quoting
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1990))).
272 See id. (citing Donovan, 751 F.2d at 1116) (noting that "[IPR] proceedings [do not]'abrogate
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties,' or that Congress did not intend the proceedings to apply
to Indians based on the legislative history of the [AIA].").
273 Id. at 18.
274 See Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Case IPR2016-00208 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017) (Paper
28); see id. at 16 (citing Bonnet v. Harvest (U.S.) Holdings, Inc., 741 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir.
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noted, "In these proceedings, we are not adjudicating any claims in which [Mylan]
may seek relief from the Tribe, and we can neither restrain the Tribe from acting
nor compel it to act in any manner based on our final decisions.'275 The PTAB
reasoned that "the scope of the authority granted by Congress to the Patent
Office with respect to interpartes review proceedings is limited to assessing the
patentability of the challenged claims. ' 276 The PTAB went on, stating that it
"exercises jurisdiction over the challenged patent in an inter partes review
proceeding.' 277 The PTAB believed that "a patent owner's participation is not
required, and interpartes reviews have proceeded to a final written decision under
35 U.S.C. 5 318(a) even where the patent owner has chosen not to participate."278
The PTAB concluded that tribal sovereign immunity was inapplicable to IPR
proceedings, reasoning that "reconsideration of the patentability of issued claims
via interpartes review is appropriate without regard to the identity of the patent
owner."279 Even if the Mohawk Tribe was entitled to assert its tribal sovereign
immunity, the PTAB determined that the IPR proceedings could continue
because Allergan was the true owner of the challenged patents and the Mohawk
Tribe was not an indispensable party.
280
b. Alleqgan Is the Effecive Owner of the RESTASIS Patents
Whether the Mohawk Tribe was an indispensable party depended on who the
effective patent owner was.281 To determine this, the PTAB asked whether the
License between the Mohawk Tribe and Allergan essentially transferred
ownership rights in the RESTASIS patents back to Allergan.282 Relying on the
2014)) ('We determine that an [IPRI proceeding is not the type of "suit" to which an Indian
tribe would traditionally enjoy immunity under the common law.") (parenthetical omitted); id.
at 7 (implying that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to exempt tribes from
proceedings similar to an IPR proceeding).
275 Mylan Iat 16.
276 Id.
277 Id
278 Id. at 17 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Global Techs., Inc., Case IPR2016-00663 (P.T.A.B.
June 2, 2017) (Paper 33); Old Republic Gen. Ins. Group, Inc. v. Owner of U.S. Patent No. 6,519,581,
Case 1PR2015-01956 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2017) (Paper 39)) (parentheticals omitted).
279 Id. at 18. The Mohawk Tribe advanced additional arguments, but this article focuses on
the important ones surrounding the differences between state and tribal sovereign immunity.
280 Id. at 40.
281 See id. at 18 ("Even assuming arguendo that the Tribe is entitled to assert immunity,
termination of these proceedings is not warranted if we can proceed with another patent
owner's participation.').
282 See id. at 19 (quoting Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp. (Mann),
604 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) ("To determine whether an exclusive license is
[Vol. 26:1
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Federal Circuit's decisions in Azure Networks v. CSR PLC283 and Alfred E. Mann
Foundation for Science Research v. Cochlar,284 the PTAB established nine factors (the
"Azure-Mann factors') assessing the rights transferred and the rights retained
under the License:
(1) the nature and scope of the right to bring suit; (2) the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell products or services under
the patent; (3) the scope of the licensee's right to sublicense; (4)
the reversionary rights to the licensor following termination or
expiration of the license; (5) the right of the licensor to receive a
portion of the proceeds from litigating or licensing the patent;
(6) the duration of the license rights; (7) the ability of the licensor
to supervise and control the licensee's activities; (8) the
obligation of the licensor to continue paying maintenance fees;
and (9) any limits on the licensee's right o assign its interests in
the patent.
285
After examining these nine factors, the PTAB determined that the 'License
transferred 'all substantial rights' in the challenged patents back to Allergan.' '286
Thus, Allergan was the effective patent owner.
287
i. Licensing Terms of the Allergan-Mohawk License
The Mohawk Tribe granted Allergan 'an irrevocable, perpetual, transferable,
and exclusive license' under the challenged patents for 'all FDA-approved uses
in the United States.'' 288 The License granted Allergan "the first right to sue for
infringement with respect to 'Generic Equivalents,' while the Tribe [retained] the
first right to sue for infringement unrelated to such Generic Equivalents.' 28 9 The
License defined "Generic Equivalent" "as a drug product that requires FDA
approval for sale in the United States, including those products covered by an
tantamount to an assignment, we must ascertain the intention of the parties [to the license
agreement] and examine the substance of what was granted.") (internal quotations omitted).
283 Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (establishing nine
factors to determine whether a license amounted to an assignment of patent rights).
284 Mann, 604 F.3d 1354 (establishing similar factors relied on in AZure Networks).
285 Mylan I at 20 (quoting Aure Networks, 771 F.3d at 1343) (internal quotations omitted)
(citing Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360-61).
286 Id. at 8.
287 Id. at 15.
288 Id. at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
289 Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
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[ANDA] for which Allergan's Restasis product is the listed reference drug. 290
In exchange for licensing the RESTASIS patents to Allergan, the Mohawk Tribe
received a licensing bonus of $13.75 million and an annual royalty of $15
million.291 Finally, the License required Allergan to pay maintenance fees for the
RESTASIS patents.
292
ii. The Mohawk Tribe Essentially Retained No Right to Sue for
Infringement293
Addressing the first Azure-Mann factor, the PTAB found that the Mohawk
Tribe retained "an illusory or superficial right to sue for infringement of the
challenged patents."294 The License granted Allergan 'the first right, but not the
obligation, to control and prosecute' infringement that relate[d] to a 'Generic
Equivalent.'' 295 As defined in the License, "Generic Equivalent" included any
FDA approved drug product in the United States, "including those products
covered by an [ANDA] for which Allergan's Restasis product [was] the listed
reference drug. '296 The RESTASIS patents were all listed in the FDA's Orange
Book and thus, the PTAB assumed that the only "viable infringement" actions
concerning the RESTASIS patents would "necessarily be limited to drug
products that require FDA approval, i.e., Generic Equivalents.'297 The PTAB
supported its argument by noting that the only suits brought at the time the
License was executed were Hatch-Waxman suits.
298
290 Id. at 8.
291 Id. at 3.
292 Id. at 8.
293 Id. at 18 (citing Mann, 640 F.3d at 1361) (citations omitted) (determining the "nature and
scope of the exclusive licensee's purported right to bring suit... and [the] scope of any right
to sue purportedly retained by the licensor" is the most important factor).
294 Id.; see also, id. at 19 (citing Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1251 (Fed. Cir.
2000)) ('The right to sue that is granted or retained in an agreement cannot merely be
"illusory" or otherwise rendered meaningless.'). The PTAB agreed with Mylan that the
"License gave Allergan (not the Tribe) primary control over 'commercially relevant
infringement proceedings,' and the Tribe was granted 'only contingent, illusory rights to
enforce the patents."' Id.. However, in Siem Systems v. Agilent Technologies, the Federal Circuit
held that a Licensee's "exclusive right to sue for 'commercial' infringement does not signify
that [the Licensee] has the exclusive right to sue for all infringement." 427 F.3d 971, 979 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). This will likely be a point of contention on appeal.
295 Id. at 8.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 22.
298 Id.. However, just because these were the only suits brought at the time does not mean
that non-commercial suits or non-FDA-approved suits would occur in the future which the
Mohawk Tribe would have the right to sue in. The next paragraph seems to explain why non-
FDA-approved suits would not be sufficient to retain substantial rights in the patents.
[V~ol. 26:1
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Although the Mohawk Tribe "retain[ed] the first right to sue for infringement
unrelated to Generic Equivalents," this was insufficient because the Mohawk
Tribe could not "indulge" in an infringement suit against a non-FDA-approved
drug.299 The License prohibited the Mohawk Tribe from licensing competing
FDA or non-FDA drugs that have "the same treatment indication as Restasis,"
i.e., dry eye.300 The PTAB inferred that this prohibition on licensing competing
products would prevent the Mohawk Tribe from bringing a suit at the risk of
granting a license to the infringer.30' Thus, the License did not allow the Mohawk
Tribe to indulge in infringement actions against competing non-FDA products.
The Mohawk Tribe's right to sue if Allergan abstained from bringing a "Generic
Equivalent" action was superficial because the License required the Mohawk
Tribe to acquire written consent to initiate and settle the action and was beholden
to Allergan's preferred trial strategy.302 Collectively, the "License terms
significantly limit[ed] the Tribe's right to sue for infringement of the challenged
patents."
303
iii. The License GrantedAllergan the Sole Right to Exclude Othersfrom
Making, Using, Selling Offering for Sale, and Imporling the
Invention
Turning to the second Azure-Mann factor, the Mohawk Tribe's rights
pertaining to the making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing of the
RESTASIS drugs were illusory because "Allergan's right to exploit the patents
for 'all FDA-approved uses' [was] effectively co-extensive with the scope of the
claimed inventions.
'"304
299 Id.; see id. at 21 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cit.
1995)) (noting that merely retaining the right to initiate an infringement action without the
right "to 'indulge' any infringement of the transferred patents by others" evidences a transfer
of substantial rights to the licensee.)
299
300 Id. at 23.
301 See id. at 24 ("[T]he 'Competing Product' language in the License effectively limits the
Tribe's ability to license any product that treats dry eye disease.").
302 Id. at 24-25.
303 Id. at 25.
304 Id. at 27. Unlike the limited "field of use" license in A 123, the License between the
Mohawk Tribe and Allergan was not limited to a specific field of use. Id. The PTAB noted
that Allergan's exclusive rights under the License encompassed all "commercially relevant
ways to practice the challenged patents." Id. Additionally, the Mohawk Tribe was not pursuing
any of the rights it retained and the License lacked any restrictions that would allow the
Mohawk Tribe to "control Allergan's ... commercial activities with regard to the challenged
patents." Id. at 29 ("Tlhe Tribe has not pointed to any record evidence showing that it is
currently engaged in any commercial or non-commercial activities in a manner that practices
that challenged patents or plans to engage in such activities in the future."); id. at 28 (noting
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iv. Allergan Had Unfettered Sub-Li'ensing Power
Next, the PTAB determined that Allergan acquired complete control over
the terms of the sublicensing of the RESTASIS patents.305 Relying on its analysis
of the first factor, the PTAB found that Allergan's right to sublicense in its
limited field of use encompassed any and all conceivable sublicensing of the
RESTASIS patents that could occur.306 The PTAB reasoned that Allergan's
sublicensing rights were not "limited in any commercially meaningful way" and
Allergan could terminate any Mohawk Tribe litigation by granting a sublicense
to the infringer.
307
v. The Mohawk Tribe's Reversionay Rights were Illusoy
Reviewing the fourth A.Zure-Mann factor, the PTAB found that the Mohawk
Tribe did not retain any reversionary rights in the patents because the License
was "perpetual" and "irrevocable" and was enforceable until the RESTASIS
patents either "expire[d] or until all the claims [were] rendered invalid in a non-
appealable final judgment."
30 8
vi. The Mohawk Tribe's Financal Rights Under the Patent were De
Minimis
Examining the fifth factor, the PTAB determined that the Mohawk Tribe's
licensing bonus and annual royalty payments were insufficient to constitute
"substantial rights" because "a financial interest ... without more does not
that the Mohawk Tribe's website stated, "[i]ts only role is to hold the patents, get assignments,
and make sure that the patent status with the [USPTO] is kept up to date.') (citations omitted)
(internal quotations omitted).
305 See id. at 29 ("[]he License 'grants Allergan all licenses and other rights (including subcense
rights relating to any Generic Equivalent) under the Licensed Patents related, necessary or useful for
Allergan to settle any Infringement Actions"') (citation omitted).
306 Id. at 30 ("The Tribe has not pointed to any License terms that allow it to veto or
otherwise control the terms of sublicenses that may be granted by Allergan.').
307 Id. at 30 ("[T]hese provisions give Allergan 'full power to end any proceeding-even one
the Tribe wants to pursue-simply by granting a sublicense."').
308 Id. at 30-31. The PTAB's decision did not trention whether the License could be
terminated if Allergan failed to pay royalties. Additionally, after searching online, the License
agreement could not be found in the public domain.
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amount to a substantial right. ' 309 Additionally, the License did not grant the
Mohawk Tribe any proceeds from Allergan's litigation or licensing activities.
310
vii. The Mohawk Tribe Lacked the Right to Control USPTO
Proceedings and Allergan was Responsible for Maintenance Fees
Moving to the seventh factor, the PTAB found that Allergan had the
"primary right, but not the obligation, to prosecute and maintain the challenged
patents, as well as the responsibility for any 'Administrative Proceedings' before
the PTO. ' 311 Furthermore, the Mohawk Tribe could only control the defense in
a USPTO proceeding when "Allergan electfed] not to defend the challenged
patents in such a proceeding.' 312 The PTAB specifically noted that the Mohawk
Tribe's subordination during USPTO proceedings to Allergan's decisions was an
indication that the License permitted Allergan to continue in a proceeding
without the Mohawk Tribe.313 Addressing the eighth factor, the PTAB found
that the icense required Allergan to pay patent maintenance fees and handle
administrative challenges to the patents, including challenges before the PTO.
314
viii. The License Prohibited the Mohawk Tribe from Assigning the
Patents to a Third Partj
Finally, looking at the ninth factor, the PTAB found that the License
prevented the Mohawk Tribe from freely assigning the RESTASIS patents to
309 Id. at 31-32 (quoting Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); id. at 32 (quoting Propat Int'l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1191
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[T]he fact that a patent owner has retained a right to a portion of the
proceeds of the commercial exploitation of the patent,. ... does not necessarily defeat what
would otherwise be a transfer of all substantial rights in the patent.")). This factor arguably
carries even more weight when one considers that the annual royalty the Mohawk Tribe would
receive would amount to only one percent of the $1.5 billion dollars in annual revenue Allergan
received from selling RESTASIS. If Allergan were licensing the patents to another
pharmaceutical manufacturer, it would likely ask for a much higher annual royalty.
310 Id. at 31.
311 Id. at 32 ("Allergan shall have ... the first right, but not the obligation, to defend and
control the defense of the validity, enforceability and patentability" of the RESTASIS patents
in USPTO proceedings).
312 Id. at 33 ("The Tribe may conduct and control the defense in any Contested PTO
Proceeding only in the event that Allergan elects not to defend the challenged patents in such
a proceeding.').
313 Id. at 33.
314 Id. at 32.
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another party.315 Thus, the Awere-Mann factors weighed in favor of a finding that
the License effectively made Allergan the true owner of the RESTASlS
patents.316 Based on the foregoing factors, the PTAB found that Allergan was
the effective patent owner and the proceeding could continue without the
Mohawk Tribe whether it was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity or not.
317
c. The Mohawk Tribe was Not an Indispensable Pary
Applying the Rule 19(b) factors similar to the Federal Circuit's application in
A 123, supra, the PTAB decided that the Mohawk Tribe was not an indispensable
party.3 18 Because Allergan was the effective patent owner, its interests in
protecting the patents from invalidity challenges were equal, if not greater, than
the Mohawk Tribe's interests in protecting the patents.319 Additionally, the
PTAB determined that the Mohawk Tribe's "incidental financial interest in the
outcome of the proceedings [was insufficient] to render the Tribe an
indispensable party.320 Thus, the Mohawk Tribe would likely not be prejudiced
if it abstained from participating in the proceedings.321 Furthermore, the PTAB
denied the Mohawk Tribe's argument that its interests would not be represented
if it sought to advance different claim construction arguments from Allergan
because the Mohawk Tribe never did so nor indicated it would advance differing
constructions.322 Overall, Allergan's effective ownership in the RESTASIS
315 Id. at 33 ("mTlhe License provides that the Tribe shall not, without Allergan's prior written
consent, 'take or fail to take any action, or enter into any agreement that would result in the
transfer' of the challenged patents to any third party'); see id at 34 (quoting Intellectual Prop.
Dev., Inc. v. TC Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[L]imits on
... assignment rights weigh in favor of finding ... a transfer of fewer than all substantial
rights in a patent.")).
316 Id. at 34-35 ("Because Allergan remains the effective patent owner, we determine that
these proceedings can continue with Allergan's participation only, regardless of whether tribal
immunity applies to the Tribe.").
317 Id. at 35.
318 Id. at 39 ("We, therefore, determine that the Tribe is not an indispensable party, and that
we may continue with these proceedings without the Tribe's participation.").
319 See id. at 37 ("Allergan has at least an identical interest to the Tribe-if not more of an
interest as the effective patent owner for the reasons discussed above-in defending the
challenged patents.").
320 Id. at 38 (alteration in original) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d
216, 230 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The 'interest' relating to the subject matter of the action that makes
an absent party a party needed for just adjudication must be a legally protected interest, not
merely a financial interest or interest of convenience.')).
321 Id.
322 Id. at 38-39 ("However, the Tribe has not sought to introduce new claim construction
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patents would likely preserve the Mohawk Tribe's "nearly identical" interests in
the RESTASIS patents.
323
In sum, the PTAB found that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply to IPR
proceedings and even if it did, the proceeding could continue because Allergan
was the effective patent owner and the Mohawk Tribe was not an indispensable
party.3
24
d. Allergan's and the Mohawk Tribe's Appeal to the Federal Circuit
On February 28, 2018, Allergan and the Mohawk Tribe filed an appeal with
the Federal Circuit and motioned to stay the IPR proceedings pending a final
decision from the Federal Circuit.325 The PTAB denied the motion.326 The PTAB
reasoned that the Mohawk Tribe would not be harmed by a determination
rendering claims of the RESTASIS patents invalid because Allergan and the
Mohawk Tribe would have the right to appeal that determination.327 Embracing
the Federal Circuit's policy allowing the PTAB to continue with IPR proceedings
before the finality of appellate review in the federal courts, the PTAB decided to
continue the IPR proceedings.328 However, on March 28, 2018, the Federal
Circuit stated, "it appears that the appeals divested the [PTAB] of jurisdiction
over the aspects of the case on appeal.., and the [PTAB] may not proceed until
granted leave by this court. '329 Accordingly, the PTAB stayed the RESTASIS
323 Id. at 39.
324 Id. at 40.
325 Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc. (Mylan 1), Case IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 8,
2018) (Paper 134 at 3-7).
326 Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc. (Mylan 1), Case 1PR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22,
2018) (Paper 137 at 4).
327 See id. at 6 ("rAiny unpatentability determination that may be tendered in our final written
decision would not cause irreparable harm, because the status of each of the challenged patent
claims remains unchanged until after any appellate review of our decisions.").
328 See Peggy P. Ni, Rethinking Finality in the PTAB Age, 31 Bi RKLrN Ti7CH. L.J. 557 (2016)
C'Mhe Federal Circuit concluded that the judgments were not sufficiently final to preclude
PTO determinations of patent invalidity because the scope of relief remained to be
determined.') (citing Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cit.
2013); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 1349, 1369 (Fed. Cit. 2015) (O'Malley,
J., dissenting)).
329 Peter Law & Kerry S. Taylor, The Federal Circuit Stays IPR Pending Review of the I'1AB's
Denial of St. Regis Mohawk Tribe's Sovereign Immunity, KNOBBE MARTENS (March 29, 2018),
https://www.knobbe.com/news/2018/03/federal-circuit-stays-ipr-pending-review-
ptab%E2%80%99s-denial-st-regis-mohawk-tribe%E2%80%99s (quoting St. Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. 18-1638 slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cit. March 28, 2018)). Questions
remain whether the Federal Circuit truly has jurisdiction to take the appeal without a final
written decision from the PTAB. See id ("The Federal Circuit appears to take the position that
the PTAB's sovereign immunity decisions are appealable even absent a final written
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IPR proceedings pending the Federal Circuit's decision on whether tribes are
immune from IPR proceedings.330 The Federal Circuit could have avoided the
tribal sovereign immunity issue entirely if it agreed with the PTAB that Allergan
was the effective patent owner with all substantial rights and the Mohawk Tribe
was not an indispensable party. Instead, the Federal Circuit held that "tribal
sovereign immunity cannot be asserted in IPRs" and refused to "reach the
parties' other arguments.
331
Relying on the FMC analysis, the Federal Circuit found that "IPR is more like
an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party. '332 The
decision was based on (1) the USPTO Director as a "politically appointed
executive branch official" with broad discretion to institute an IPR;333 (2) the
parties' insignificant role during IPR proceedings;334 (3) the functional and
procedural differences between IPR and district court proceedings;335 and (4)
"while the USPTO has the authority to conduct reexamination proceedings that
are more inquisitorial and less adjudicatory than IPR, this does not mean that
IPR is thus necessarily a proceeding in which Congress contemplated tribal
immunity to apply. ' 336 The Federal Circuit concluded:
The Director's important role as a gatekeeper and the Board's
authority to proceed in the absence of the parties convinces us
that the USPTO is acting as the United States in its role as a
superior sovereign to reconsider a prior administrative grant and
decision."); see also, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) ("The determination by the Director whether to institute
an interpartes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable."). But see, Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2138 (2016) (noting that 5 314(d) "may not bar
consideration of a constitutional question...'D.
330 Mylan Pharma., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc. (Myan IV), Case IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Mar.
28, 2018) (Paper 139 at 2).
331 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
332 Id. at 1327.
333 Id. at 1328 ("It is the Director, the politically appointed executive branch official, not the
private party, who ultimately decides whether to proceed against the sovereign.').
334 Id. (noting that the Director and Board can continue without the patent owner or the
original petitioner in specific situations).
335 Id. at 1328-1329 (noting that "petitioner may only make clerical and typographical
corrections to its petition," whereas plaintiff can amend complaint in court); Id. (noting that
the patent owner can amend its claims during an IPR, but cannot amend its claims during
district court litigation); Id. ("discovery is limited to (A) the deposition ofwitnesses submitting
affidavits or declarations; and (B) what is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.")
(internal quotations omitted).
336 Id. at 1329.
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protect the public interest in keeping patent monopolies "within
their legitimate scope.
' ' 337
The Mohawk Tribe and Allergan's petition for en banc rehearing was denied
by the Federal Circuit.3 38 Thus, the Mohawk Tribe and Allergan are now
petitioning for certiorari to the Supreme Court.3 39 If the Supreme Court
sanctions Allergan's strategy, it could have implications for IPR proceedings and
the general public.
D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALLERGAN'S ALI STRATEGY:
MONETIZING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AT THE EXPENSE OF IPR
PROCEEDINGS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE
1. Allgan's Attempt to Monetiz<e Sovereign Immuniy Risks Undermining
IPRs
The ALl strategy could impact IPR proceedings and the general public if the
federal courts rule in favor of Allergan and the Mohawk Tribe. In a parallel
proceeding in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas involving
Allergan, Mylan, and the RESTASIS patents, Judge William Bryson stated that
"sovereign immunity should not be treated as a monetfizable commodity that can
be purchased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal
responsibilities."340 According to Judge Bryson, the monetization of sovereign
immunity "could spell the end of the PTO's 1PR program, which was a central
component of the [AIA]."341 IPR proceedings were intended to "establish a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that [would] improve patent quality and
337 Id. The Federal Circuit's opinion also stated, "While we recognize there are many
parallels, we leave for another day the question of whether there is any reason to treat state
sovereign immunity differently." Id. However, the Federal Circuit's FMC analysis directly
contradicts the PTAB's decisions concerning state sovereign immunity. This is particularly
true considering the Federal Circuit's analysis broadly applied to all IPR proceedings, not just
ones involving Native American Tribes. Thus, the Federal Circuit's opinion may have an
impact on state sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings.
338 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharma. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cit. 2018), rehg
en banc denied, No. 18-1638, (Fed. Cit. October 22, 2018).
339 As of the date of writing no petition has yet been filed, but Allergan and the Tribe have
filed a motion to stay the IPR proceeding in light of a pending petition for certiorari. See
Motion of Appellants Allergan, Inc. and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe to stay execution of the
mandate until filing and disposition of petition for Certiorari, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v.
Mylan Pharma. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cit. 2018) (No. 18-1638)
340 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Allergan 1), No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL
4619790, slip op. at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (emphasis added).
34i Id. at *4.
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limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.' ' 3 2 Therefore,
monetizing sovereign immunity in patent law would decrease the efficacy that
IPR proceedings were intended to create in the patent system.
2. Impact on Pharmaceutical Compelition and Drug Prices
Furthermore, several scholars point out that the monetization of sovereign
immunity allows companies like Allergan to "maintain a dominant market
position to the detriment of competitors and consumers.
' 343 This school of
thought holds that IPR proceedings compliment competition in the
pharmaceutical market "by voiding the market power created by invalid
patents."344 The invalidation of improperly granted pharmaceutical patents
would allow generic drug companies to enter the market and thus, increase
competition and decrease drug prices.345 Therefore, the monetization of
sovereign immunity in patent law could impact competition in the
pharmaceutical business, raise drug prices, and hurt consumers. Unless Congress
or the Supreme Court step in, the monetization of sovereign immunity could
have far reaching implications for the patent system, IPR proceedings, and the
general public.
342 H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, 112th pt. 1, at 39 (2011). Since there implementation, IPR
proceedings have successfully and significantly cut litigation costs for plaintiffs and
defendants. See Josh Landau, Inter Partes Review: Five Years, over $2Bilion Saved, Patent Progress
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/09/14/inter-partes-review-saves-
over-2-bllion/ (estimating that in five years since being implemented, "IPR has saved
plaintiffs and defendants $2.31 billion in deadweight losses, primarily in the form of legal
fees'); Gau Bodepudi, Debunking the IPR Mth of Nominal Impact to Overall Costs, JPWATCHDOG
(Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/08/debunking-ipr-myth-nominal-
impact-costs/id=94230/ (estimating that "IPRs in 2017 result[ed] in an overall-cost savings
of +$238.8M.').
343 Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng & Theodore T. Lee, When Patents are Sovereigns: The Competilive Harms
of Leasing Tribal Immunity, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 848, 850 (2018); See id ("Mf upheld, these
kinds of transactions make it more likely that brand-name firms maintain their market
exclusivity, leading to higher drug prices and harming consumers.').
344 Id. at 853.
345 See id. at 853-54 (citations omitted) ("If patents are invalidated before the end of their
statutory term, generic drugs may enter the market. Prices then drop dramatically, as average
pharmaceutical treatment costs can decline by up to 84% after genetic entry.'); id. at 854 (citing
C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivioy: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 952 (2011)) ("Mhe price for a month's supply of a
branded cholesterol drug decreased from more than $150 to $7 in less than a year after generic
entry."); id. (citing Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 17 (2013)) ("Over
the last decade, generic competition has generated nearly $1 trillion in savings for
consumers.').
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E. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION: DISCRIMINATION OR PROPER
LEGISLATION?
Enraged by Allergan's strategy to monetize tribal sovereign immunity,
Congress introduced a bill "[to] abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes
as a defense in inter partes review of patents.'346 The bill is facing resistance
because it "only discriminate[s] against Native American Indian Tribes and
would allow state universities to continue asserting their sovereign immunity."
'347
Additionally, the Senate's bill could undermine the PTAB's statement that
"general Acts of Congress apply to Indians ... in the absence of a clear
expression to the contrary. '348 The bill expressly abrogates tribal sovereign
immunity as a defense to IPR proceedings.349 Therefore, the bill might signal to
the courts that the AIA was not a general act of Congress intended to apply to
Native American tribes. However, tribal sovereign immunity is stil "subject to
the superior and plenary control of Congress.' 350 Therefore, if the Senate bill is
passed and challenged, the courts may find that Congress has the power to pass
this bill regardless of its discrimination against Native American tribes. If
Allergan's strategy ultimately fails, it may take a different direction.
F. ALLERGAN'S POTENTIAL CONTINGENCY PLAN: MONETIZE STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
1. Monetizing State Sovereign Immunio
Allergan encountered several obstacles in its attempt to monetize tribal
sovereign immunity in patent law. However, its strategy stems from the extensive
state sovereign immunity cases discussed in Part II, supra. If the strategy to rent
tribal sovereign immunity fails, it may attempt to rent state sovereign immunity
346 S. 1948, 115 th Cong. § 1 (2017). See Press Release, Senator Claire McCaskill, McCaskill to
PhRMA: Are You Comfortable With Allergan's Action With Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe? (Oct.
3, 2017) (on file with author) ("This is one of the most brazen and absurd loopholes I've ever
seen, and it should be illegal...").
347 Gene Quinn, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Outraged at Senator McCaskill Over Sovereign Immuni
Bill, IPWatchdog (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/06/saint-regis-
mohawk-tribe-outraged-senator-mccaskill- sovereign-imrunity-bill/id=89007/.
348 Mylan Pharm., v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018)
(Paper 130 at 11) (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120
(1960)).
349 S. 1948, 115th Cong. 5 1 (2017).
350 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); see also Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal
Sovereign Immuniy and Patent Law, Stan. L. Sch. (Sept. 13, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/
2017/09/13/tribal- sovereign-immunity-and-patent-law/ ("Congress possesses plenary power
over tribes, which means it can alter or even abolish tribal sovereignty at will.").
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by assigning patents to a state entity.35' As discussed throughout this article, state
sovereign immunity is engrained in the Eleventh Amendment, common law, the
Framers' intent, and the states' dignity. Thus, overcoming the monetization of
state sovereign immunity in patent law could be extremely difficult.
2. Waiver of State Sovereign Immunity in an IPR Proceeding: Ericsson v. Regents
of the Universioy Of Minnesota5 2
Despite this difficulty, the PTAB recently ruled that a state entity waived its
sovereign immunity in an IPR proceeding. In Ericsson v. Regents of the University of
Minnesota ("Ericsson"), the PTAB found that a state entity "waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by filing an action in federal court alleging infringement
of the patent being challenged in [the] proceeding."'353 The PTAB's decision
relied on the Federal Circuit's holding in Regents of Universioy ofNew Mexico v. Knight
("Knight). In Knight, the Federal Circuit held a state reasonably waived its
sovereign immunity in the same suit because it "[could] surely anticipate that a
defendant [would] have to file any compulsory counterclaims or be forever
barred from doing so."' 354 Similarly, the PTAB found that the state entity
reasonably waived its right to sovereign immunity because it knew that the
defendant would have to file an IPR within one year after being sued for patent
infringement or would "be forever barred from doing so.' 3 s The PTAB
reasoned that "[]t would be unfair and inconsistent to allow a State to avail itself
... in federal court, but then selectively invoke its sovereign immunity" to avoid
an IPR on the same patent in suit.356
351 This assumes that a state entity is as easy to deal with as a tribe. For example, the Mohawk
Tribe has three chiefs that "exercise all legislative and executive powers of the Tribe ... To
negotiate and contract with ... private organizations, corporations, and other entities." SAINT
REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, TRIBAL COUNCIL PROCEDURES ACT OF 1994 4
(C)(12) (April 2013), https://www.srmt- nsn.gov/_uploads/site files/temp file TribalProc
eduresAct__FinalDraftApprovedAtReferendum060l20l3l.pdf. In contrast, the University of
Houston has a board of regents with nine members and a president, all of whom have
designated terms. Thus, negotiation a license with a state entity, similar to a state university,
could be problematic.
352 Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. Minn., Inc., No.2017-01186, 01197, 01200, 01213,
01214, 01219 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2017) (Paper 14).
353 Id. at 11.
354 Regents of Univ. of New Mexico v. Knight (Knight), 321 F.3d 1111, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
355 Ericsson at 8.
356 Id. at 8-9. The PTAB's fairness rationale came from the Supreme Court's holding in
Lapides v. Board of Regents of the Universio System of Geoqia, 535 U.S. 613 (2002). In Lapides, the
Supreme Court held that it was unfair to allow a state to "invoke federal jurisdiction... and
[ to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity... to the case at hand." Id. at 619.
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However, in Knight, the Federal Circuit held that states and their
instrumentalities only waive their right to litigation "in the same forum [for] all
compulsory counterclaims, i.e., those arising from the same transaction or occurrence
that gave rise to the state's asserted claims.' '357 Thus, the state entity in Ericsson
argued that "any waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity should be limited to
the venue where [the] Patent Owner filed its action. '358 To distinguish Knight, the
PTAB argued that "even though an interpartes review has characteristics that are
similar to district court litigation, the proceedings are not the same."359 Thus,
sovereign immunity would unfairly "bar [the] Petitioner from obtaining the
benefits of an interpartes review."360 Accordingly, the PTAB held that the state
entity waived its sovereign immunity when it filed an infringement action on the
same patent being challenged in the IPR proceeding.361
The PTAB's decision in Ericsson has been appealed to the Federal Circuit.36
2
Therefore, the Federal Circuit, and possibly the Supreme Court, will likely have
to decide whether state sovereign immunity applies to IPR proceedings and
whether a state waives its sovereign immunity when it files an infringement
action in the district court on the same patents challenged in the 1PR proceeding.
If the states win this battle, then it could encourage patent owners to monetize
state sovereign immunity to protect their patents from IPR proceedings. Thus,
the Ericsson case will likely have a big impact on the 1PR system and patent law
as a whole.
357 Knight, 321 F.3d at 1126 (emphasis added).
358 See Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at 10.
359 Idat 11.
3 Id.
3-61 Id.Tbe PTAB's decision is interesting because earlier that same year the PTAB stated,
"[C]onsidering the nature of inter partes review and civil litigation, we conclude that the
considerable resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to the
States by the Eleventh Amendment." Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No.
IPR2016-1274 (P.T.A.B.Jan. 25,2017) (Paper 19 at 24). Although not mentioned in its Ericsson
decision, the PTAB would likely rely on procedural history to distinguish Ericsson from Covidien
and Neochord. Id; Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-208 (P.T.A.B. May
23, 2017) (Paper 28). In Covidien, the state entity sued the IPR petitioner for a breach of a
license contract. Covidien at 3. In Neochord, the state entity had not filed a federal court action.
Neochord at 2. Thus, the PTAB might rely on this procedural history to show that the state
entity in Ericsson waived its right to sovereign immunity because it filed an infringement action
in federal court on the same patents being challenged in the IPR proceeding.
362 Scott McKeown, P7AB Sovereign Immunity Dispute Heads to CAFC, ROPES & GRAY (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-sovereign-immunity-dispute-heads-cafc/
(noting that the Regents of the University of Minnesota appealed the PTAB's decision).
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G. THE INSTITUTIONAL ISSUE THAT MOTIVATED THE
MONETIZATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Monetizing tribal and state sovereign immunity could have serious
implications for the TPR system, but the strategy also raises concerns over the
Supreme Court's state sovereign immunity doctrine. Specifically, the Supreme
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, abolishing Congress' power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under Article I, has been the driving force that led to
Allergan's ALI strategy.363 This institutional issue is discussed in detail injustice
Breyer's College Savings dissent and will be addressed in Part IV.
364
V. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY'S DOMINANCE OVER PATENT LAW: AN
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUE STEMMING FROM SEMINOLE TR/BE
365
By interpreting the Constitution as rendering immutable this one
common-law doctrine (sovereign immunity), Seminole Tribe
threatens the Nation's ability to enact economic legislation
needed for the future in much the way that Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905), threatened the
Nation's ability to enact social legislation over 90 years ago....
The similarity to Lochnerlies in the risk that Seminole Tribe and the
Court's subsequent cases will deprive Congress of necessary
legislative flexibility.
366
justice Breyer's College Savings dissent marks Seminole Tribe as the culprit hindering
Congress' power to pass flexible patent legislation that shakes and moves with
the "increasingly interrelated and complex world."367 Justice Breyer argued that
the "contours of federalist doctrine have changed over the course of our Nation's
history," but that federalism has always protected liberty "by promoting the
sharing among citizens of governmental decision-making authority."368 Breyer
identified the "modem substantive federalist problem" as a balance between
preserving local control when necessary and providing national legislation that
fosters large markets and protects industry in a global marketplace.369
Accordingly, Breyer argued that "the modern substantive federalist problem
demands a flexible, context-specific legislative response (and it does not help to
363 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.
364 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
365 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.
366 College Savings, 527 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
367 Id. at 703.
368 Id. at 702-03.
369 Id. at 703-04.
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constitutionalize an historic view of sovereign immunity that, by freezing its
remedial limitations, tends to place the State beyond the reach of law.)"
370
Justice Breyer's dissent recognized the forthcoming globalization and
technological advancement that would occur in the early 2000's and the
corresponding national legislation needed to protect liberty. Congress created
IPR proceedings to help invalidate improperly granted patents and curb the
burdensome litigation plaguing patent law before the AlA. 3 7' IPR proceedings
represent flexible economic legislation designed to adapt patent law to an ever
changing and complex technological world. Additionally, IPR proceedings
protect liberty, according to Justice Breyer's definition, by enlisting citizens to
help the USPTO determine whether it properly granted a patent in the first
place.37 2 The monetization of sovereign immunity is a perfect example of how
sovereign immunity "deprive[s] Congress of necessary legislative flexibility.
373
This falls squarely within Justice Breyer's fear of sovereign immunity "inhibit[ing]
the creation of innovative legal regimes" designed to protect liberty.
3 7 4
Justice Breyer ended by stating that, "Seminole Tribe and today's related
decisions separate one formal strand from the federalist skein-a strand that has
been understood as antirepublican since the time of Cicero-and they elevate
that strand to the level of an immutable constitutional principle more akin to the
thought of James I ... .,,375 In Justice Breyer's opinion, "by making [sovereign
immunity] immune from congressional Article I modification," the Court
essentially restricted the flexibility Congress needed "to satisfy modern
federalism's more important liberty-protecting needs."37 6 The monetization of
tribal and potentially state sovereign immunity is an assault on this liberty.
Unfortunately, Congress may be powerless to stop the assault based on the
Supreme Court's state sovereign immunity precedent. Unless the Supreme Court
loosens or overturns its Seminole Tribe holding, sovereign immunity will continue
to undermine and manipulate patent law.
3 77
370 Id. at 704.
371 See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR 2016-01274 (P.T.A.B.
Jan. 25, 2017) (Paper 19 at 20) (citation omitted) (noting that IPR was supposed to "establish
a more efficient and streamlined patent system that [would] improve patent quality and limit
unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.'".
372 See 35 U.S. C.S. 311 (a)-(b) ("[A] person who is not the owner of a patent ... may
request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be
raised under section 102 or 103..
373 College Savings, 527 U.S. at 701.
374 Id. at 702.
375 Id. at 704.
376 Id. at 705.
377 Although Seminole Tribe dictates Congress' abrogation powers, Justice Ginsburg still
believes that Congress can validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce
Clause in Article I of the Constitution. Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 46 n.1
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article has embarked on a long journey demonstrating the raw power of
state sovereign immunity in patent law. Although Allergan's attempt to monetize
sovereign immunity raises substantial concerns, it has revealed a greater
institutional issue stemming from a rampant Supreme Court precedent better
akin to "the [state] can do no wrong," but everyone else can. Taken to its
extreme, it appears states have reached a level of Czarism that transcends
Congress' hope of passing and implementing uniform, fair, and flexible patent
legislation to promote and foster innovation, private rights, and liberty. Time will
only tell whether tribal, and possibly state, sovereign immunity will demolish IPR
proceedings. Fortunately, the PTAB has taken a strong stance against Allergan's
practice for the time being.
(2012) ("I remain of the view that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to its Article I Commerce Clause power.").
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